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ADVANCED COURSE
1928-29

THE DAY BEFORE CANTIGNY ✓

(The Raid on the 28th Infantry, 1st Division, ✓
American Expeditionary Forces, France,
on 27 May 1918.

Personal Experiences of a Company Commander) ✓

CAPTAIN EDWARD S. JOHNSTON, INFANTRY ✓



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Chambrun and Marenches ✓

"The American Army in the European Conflict", The Macmillan Company, New York, 1919

A sympathetic treatment by military men of the American participation in the World War; particularly informing as to the 1st Division, with which the Comte de Chambrun served as a liaison officer. Somewhat reserved, naturally, as to the stark realities of the desperate situation in which the French high command found itself in April and May 1918.

File 052E 2, ✓

The Academic-Department Library, The Infantry School.

A file of orders, reports, and memoranda, including a War Department summary or study, relating to the operations of the 1st Division at Cantigny. Excellent source material.

Field Orders No 14, 1st Division, 1918. From World War Records, 1st Division, A.E.F., Regular, 1928. ✓

Valuable source material.

"1st Division Diary" (File 314.7-A-1, Academic-Department Library, The Infantry School).

Consists, as a matter of fact, of a series of extracts rendered to higher authority by the 1st Division during 1918. Excellent source material.

G-3 Memoranda 385, 409, 416, 437, Headquarters 1st Division, 1918 (From File 052E 2; see above).

Valuable source material.

Helseley, A.B., Captain ✓

"The Part Played by the Machine Gun Company 18th Infantry, 1st Division, During the Capture and Defense of Cantigny, France, May 28-30, 1918".

An excellent military report of the matter indicated by the subject. Of value as bearing upon the morale, discipline, and the battle routine of lower units during the operations referred to.

"History of the First Division", John O. Winston Company, Philadelphia, 1922.

The standard history, to date, of the 1st Division, published by the Society of the First Division.

✓ Contains much very valuable material. As to smaller units, however, it is not always strictly accurate.

Johnson, Douglas W.

"Battlefields of the Great War", The Oxford University Press, New York, 1921.

✓ An authoritative work on the physical geography of the area of the Western Front.

Johnson, Thomas M.

"Without Censor", The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1928.

?
A recent and very readable popular account of the larger background of American operations in France in 1918. Has received favorable comment by way of review in military periodicals.

Ludendorff, Eric von

"Ludendorff's Own Story", Harper and Brothers, London and New York, 1919. (In two volumes.)

✓ A famous personal military memoir by one of the great figures of the World War. Accurate so far as it bears on the subject of this monograph.

"New York Times Current History: The European War", The New York Times Company, New York, 1914-1919 (Volume 16).

✓ A popular contemporary account of the Cantigny operations is included herein. It is very general, and of no special military value.

Operations Orders of the German 78th Reserve Division, covering the raid made by troops of that organization against the American 26th Division in Siecheprey.

✓ These orders, copies of which are in the possession of Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hossfeld, U.S.A., constitute authentic source material as to this operation and others of its kind.

Page, A.W.

✓ "Our 110 Days' Fighting", The Doubleday Page and Company, Garden City, New York, 1920.

Van Every, Dale

"The A.E.F. in Battle", D.
Appleton and Company, New York,
1928.

✓ A recent short, popular history.
Contains a preface by Major General
Hanson Ely, who, as colonel, command-
ed the 28th Infantry at Cantigny.
Excellent as to the larger matters,
this work is necessarily vague as to
smaller units.

Wiggam, Albert Edward,

"Exploring Your Mind", Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Indianapolis,
1928.

✓ A popular treatise on psychology, by
a noted biologist, collaborating
with numerous authorities on psy-
chology. A trustworthy, readable
presentation of recent psychological
findings.

Wise, Jennings C.

"The Turn of the Tide", Henry
Holt and Company, New York, 1920.

✓ A brief but excellent post-war study
of the campaign of 1918 in France.
Like almost all such works, however,
its scope permits of little space for
the detailed operations of small
units.

ORAL PERSONAL ACCOUNTS

✓ Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Maxey
Lieutenant Colonel George C. Marshall
Major Clarence R. Huebner
Major Robert K. Whitson
Major William F. Lee
Major Paul L. Ransom
Captain James V. Ware
Captain Benjamin F. Caffey
Captain Welcome P. Waltz
Captain George E. Butler
Lieutenant Avery
Lieutenant John V. Curry
Lieutenant Simon
Lieutenant Wilmer Bodenstab
Lieutenant Paul W. Barnett
Sergeant Weaverling
Platoon Sergeant, 1st Platoon, Company E 28th Infantry
(Name not of record)

✓
A popular account; provides a general narrative of the Cantigny operation and of other phases of the American effort in the World War. Considered accurate as to the larger issues.

Palmer, Frederick

"America in France", Dodd, Mead and Company, New York, 1919.

✓
Another popular account. Of little value for other than a general survey, as to the Cantigny operations.

Report, Commanding Officer 28th Infantry, as to the Cantigny operation. In File 052-E, Academic-Department Library, The Infantry School.

✓
Dated 2 June 1918, this is the contemporary official report of the operation referred to. It is necessarily general in scope as to the small units, but constitutes a valuable historical document.

Report of Capture of Cantigny and Consolidation of Position, by the Commanding General 1st Division. (File 052-E, Infantry School.)

✓
Rendered in December 1918, a considerable period after the event, this is not a contemporary report. It was presumably compiled from records, and is entitled to earnest consideration. It is not, however, accurate as to small units.

Revue d'Infanterie, September 1923 (French Infantry Journal), Academic-Department Library, The Infantry School.

✓
Contains a most interesting article on the fighting at Cantigny before the arrival of Americans there, and a good estimate of the tactical and strategical importance of the locality.

Thomas, Shipley

"History of the A.E.F.", George H. Doran Company, New York, 1920.

Unquestionably the best history of American participation in the World War published in the years immediately following the armistice. An excellent account, but, like practically all other such works, very vague and sometimes inaccurate as to small units.

THE STAGE-SETTING FOR CANTIGNY

When, during the period 21--24 May 1918, the 28th Infantry, 1st Division, American Expeditionary Forces, moved back from the front line opposite Cantigny (1), to prepare for the first distinctive American offensive of the World War, the regiment had been in France for almost a year. The first combat organization of the American army to reach the theater of operations, it had quitted its transports on 26 June 1917 (2), and since then, in company with its sister regiments, had undergone a most rigorous training (3) under highly proficient French instructors; profiting also from British experience through the detail of selected personnel to that army's schools, as well as by the invaluable services of officers of American origin who now left the British and Canadian forces to join their fellow-countrymen, this much-expanded regular-army regiment had gradually welded together its core of Old-Army officers and enlisted men, its younger regular-army and emergency officers, and its considerable accretions of war-time volunteers.

With the other elements of the Division, the 28th Infantry had experienced a tour by battalion units in the quiet Sommerviller sector in Lorraine (see Special Map No 1), had returned for further training to its billets in the Gondrecourt area (near Toul), and had gained additional valuable experience in a longer tour in the more active

- (1) G-3 Memo
385, 18
May 18
- (2) Hist. 1st
Div, p. 6
- (3) Hist. 1st
Div, pp.
14-26
- (4) Hist. 1st
Div, pp.
27-66

Ansauville sector just to the north. (4)

The men of the 1st Division had by this time

MARGINAL ABBREVIATIONS USED

✓ Chambrun	"The American Army in the European Conflict"
File O5E 2	Academic-Department Library
FO 14	Field Orders No 14, 1st Division, 1918
1st Div Diary	"1st Division Diary", File 314.4-A-1, Academic-Department Library.
G-3 Memo 385)	Headquarters 1st Division, 1918
409)	
416)	
437)	
Hist. 1st Div	"History of the First Division"
Johnson, D.W.	"Battlefields of the Great War"
Johnson, T.M.	"Without Censor"
Ludendorff	"Ludendorff's Own Story"
Orders German 78th Reserve Div	Operations Orders of the German 78th Reserve Division for the raid on Siecheprey
Page	"Our 110 Days' Fighting"
Rept. CO 28th Inf	Report, Commanding Officer 28th Infantry, as to the Cantigny operation
Rept. CG 1st Div	Report of Capture of Cantigny and Consolidation of Position, by Commanding General 1st Division
Revue d'Infanterie	Revue d' Infanterie, September 1923
Thomas	"History of the A.E.F."
Wiggam	"Exploring Your Mind"
Wise	"The Turn of the Tide"

weathered a severe winter, they had felt the lack at times of clothing and other necessaries, and had often been without ordinary comforts. They were familiar with trench routine and with stabilized-warfare methods, and, living and training for many months in the line and--when out of it--within sound of the guns, they were more adequately prepared than any other American unit could be, under existing circumstances, for the exacting demands of active operations.

When the great German offensive of 21 March 1918 almost shattered the Allied armies, parting the British from the French, and driving a broad and deep salient toward Amiens (see Special Map No 1), the much-needed and oft-discussed unification of the Allied command at last became a reality; and the new Generalissimo, receiving General Pershing's unreserved offer of every man at his disposition, asked for the

- (5) War Dept study in File 052E 2 (6) (7) Moved north to the Gisors area (northwest of Inf Sch Paris), the Division came under the command of the (reserve) French Fifth Army (General Micheler), where it was subjected to further tests as to its probable combat value. (8)
- (6) Page, p. 16
- (7) Chambrun, pp.133-135
- (8) Chambrun, pp.138-140

Fighting of a desperate nature was still going on in the Amiens salient. The old trench systems were gone, and the battle--by this time taking a trend somewhat more favorable to the Allies--had developed into a stage of semi-open warfare. (8)

- (8) Chambrun (as above)

The hopes of the Allied peoples, stunned by the rapid and far-reaching success of the recent German offensive, were at this time at a low ebb. The "home front" was giving way to despair; and it was apparent to the world at large that this was a major crisis in

(9) Page, p.16
(10) Chambrun,
pp.133-35

the great conflict. (9) (10) The new army of the United States was the sole hope of the despondent Allied peoples--soldiers and civilians alike, but whereas the ability of America to furnish troops in numbers seemed fairly well established, the combat value of those troops was still, in certain quarters, a matter of doubt. (11)

(11) Page,
p.19 et
seqq.

The relief of the 1st Division from the Ansaerville sector, by the American 28th Division--necessarily of less advanced training--had been

(12) Orders,
German 78th
Reserve
Div

followed by a powerful German raid (12), launched on 30 April. This assault effected considerable confusion in the Siecheprey subsector (the former haunt of the 28th Infantry), and made captures in men and in materiel. The efficient propaganda service of the Central Powers was not slow to profit by this opportunity; the news was disseminated by every available agency, and these tidings, published broadcast to neutral countries, reacted on Allied morale, placing the American army in a very unfavorable light. (13)

(13) Thomas,
pp.72-73

The French troops had for the moment almost lost the spirit of the offensive; the British army had exhibited alarming indications that might portend a failure even to hold their present positions; the Allied command was in desperate fear of a new enemy offensive which might reach the channel ports. And so, political and military considerations, alike, demanded an early and dramatic entry of American soldiery on the actual field of battle. For moral effect, if for no other reason, it was necessary for the American Expeditionary Forces to score a brilliant and clean-cut success, no matter on how small a scale.

(14) Lt Col
Marshall

(14) To achieve this purpose the 1st Division was of course the logical instrument.

Charged by their government with so heavy a responsibility for the future conduct of this untried Division, the French command no doubt experienced grave anxiety. Conditions were still such that it was thought the necessity might arise of committing the Americans to battle at any moment (14); but for such preparations as time might permit, it was probably felt that no precaution should be overlooked. General Micheler accordingly made a painstaking inspection of training and interior economy, before deciding to pass the Division to one of the front-line

(14) Lt Col
Marshall
(as above)

armies. (15)

(15) Chambrun,
pp. 138-40

If, however, the French authorities thus harbored an uneasy doubt, such was not the case with the command of the Division itself. For when it appeared that only one feature was delaying the release to the front (that being the condition of the artillery animals, which had been on short rations for a long time, and were also suffering from mange)

(16) Chambrun,
pp. 138-40

(16), the commanding general of the Division with his artillery brigadier called on the army commander, and brought the matter up for comment. In the discussion that followed, the visitors expressed surprise that the condition of the draft animals should give rise to anxiety, and General Micheler gained the impression that the Americans always kept their horses in just that sort of shape, that it was their regular and

~~and would excite no particular~~
notice in the United States, nor have any ill-effects. Apparently convinced that he had been magnifying out

of all proportion a matter that was in truth merely one of the national eccentricities of his American comrades, and would not seriously affect their fighting efficiency, General Micheler withdrew his

- (17) Capt. Caffery's objections. (17) The French reserves in that region, also, were very low at the time, and the entry of the Americans into the battle would free French troops for other duty. (18) Accordingly the 1st Division was declared fit for combat, and prepared to enter the front line. (19)
- (18) Lt Col Marshall
- (19) Hist. 1st Div, p. 67

The front of the contending armies had now almost stabilized except at certain points east of Amiens. The intensity of the fighting was diminishing along the curve of the salient, southward, toward Montdidier. Headquarters 1st Division desired to enter the line east of Amiens in the area of the most active fighting, but higher authority directed the course of the organization to the south. The Division passed to the French First Army (holding from Montdidier to the north), and came under the command of the French VI Corps. During the period 25--27 April it relieved elements of the 45th Colonial Division, and so entered the front line opposite Cantigny, at the very point of the great salient. (20) (21) (22)

- (20) Chambrun, pp. 141 et seqg.
- (21) War Dept study, File 052E-2, Inf Sch FO 14, 1st Div, 20 Apr 18

The new sector was in an interesting situation, both geographically and strategically. (See Special Map No 1) Cantigny was situated, as it happened, on a plateau which dominated the near-by Allied positions, nor was any similar and equally-desirable terrain feature available to the invader

- (23) Ludendorff II, p. 234 within thirty miles to his rear (east) (23). This

plateau, also, with its attendant hills and ridges to the flanks, formed part of a great geographical pillar on the right (west) of a wide natural gateway leading southwest to Paris (24) (25). From the

(24) Revue d' Infanterie
(25) Johnson, D.W. pp. 178-82

strategical and grand-tactical point of view, therefore, it was to be expected that the German army would desire to retain its positions here: first, in order to support its right in any further advance to the southwest (as later eventuated, in the Montdidier-Noyon offensive); and, second, in order to continue

(26) Ludendorff, II, p. 334

to threaten Amiens (26). But, located as the 1st Division was, at the point of the new salient, it was not to be apprehended that the Americans would find themselves in the path of a major hostile offensive. On the other hand, from this point, with or without the cooperation of other (French) divisions, it could if necessary attack the flank of the German forces facing south on Paris, in conjunction with French troops on the south face of the salient, which would in such a case attack to the north. (27)

(27) Lt Col Marshall

Thus, the situation of the Division was the result of a nice calculation to carry out the desires of the Allied governments. Here the final polish could be given to its training, and here at the first favorable opportunity it could launch an attack,--perhaps as part of a major effort, but in any event at least a local attack to gain a distinct and significant tactical locality. This attack, if it had a favorable outcome, would announce to the world that the American army could be relied upon to play its part in the death struggle of Europe.

Perhaps the most apt description of the

new home of the 1st Division was that attributed to a French officer who is alleged to have said, "It is not a sector, but a good place to make one." For this was virgin battle ground. The recent dead of the past month's fighting, during which the line had swayed back and forth over the Cantigny plateau, lay scattered through the spring grass and the young wheat. The front line consisted of one or two narrow, shallow trenches, not everywhere continuous. The regimental reserves, on a secondary crest about a mile to the rear, and the reserves of higher echelons about two miles farther west, were the objects of frequent visitation by active hostile aviation, and of almost continuous artillery bombardment. The field guns and howitzers of the 1st Division seldom dispatched a daily total of less than 10,000 projectiles; and, on his part, the foe, from ninety battery positions, responded in a spirited manner. His cannon interdicted roads and trails, harassed artillery emplacements, and smashed the buildings of the recently deserted villages, driving the reserves out of them to take refuge in new, shallow trenches in the open. In one night, alone, the hostile artillery flung 15,000 gas and high-explosive shells into a village opposite Cantigny, inflicting over 850 casualties. (28) The usual daily American loss in the sector was about 25 men, and this was not considered excessive under the circumstances (29). French officers present considered conditions even comparable as to artillery activity, with the latter stages of the Verdun battle. The spring-time sunshine fell on a smiling countryside of meadow, grain, and

(28) Hist. 1st Div, pp. 69-77

(29) Chambrun, p. 145

as a line of departure for the project^{ed} attack toward the east, should this plan become operative through the necessity of providing a counterstroke for the still-expected new German offensive to the north (31).

(31) Lt Col
Marshall
(32) Hist. 1st
Div, p. 76

When the 28th Infantry, on 14 May (32), relieved the 18th in the front line, it found its forward elements established on top of the Cantigny plateau (Special Map No 2), about 200 to 300 yards from the hostile front, which ran north and south just west of the village. The exposed position of garrison here, the activity necessarily concentrated on patrolling and the like, and the work required in the rear and on the right, had so far permitted little improvement in the organization of the ground in this area. Only one narrow, twisted band of barbed wire--with numerous gaps--was present in front of the position here; the line of resistance and the support line (where two trenches made such a distinction possible) were within 50 to 75 yards each of the other, and the parapets of the shallow slit trenches serving these purposes were under grazing fire from the hostile position.

Work was begun at once on two traverse-type fire trenches, slightly in rear of the existing system and largely on the reverse slope of the plateau. This slope, at first gradual, pitched downward in a sudden and sharp descent to the floor of "Death Valley" in rear; and it was in the steep bank above the valley, at the west (rear) edge of the plateau, that the left-company command post, to which we shall have occasion to refer later, was located. The new trenches, which were really designed as lines of departure for the

wood; but the green of the fields was gradually graying with a film of white from the chalky sub-soil, the forest patches were writhing into distorted masses, the villages were dissolving slowly into slag heaps; the encircling horizon rang at all hours with the reverberations of cannon, and this ~~was~~ vast orchestral accompaniment of war was punctuated at intervals by an obbligate of machine guns, and now and then by the rattle of musketry.

It was an active sector.

Vague

For the purposes of this account a description of the troop dispositions and terrain features may be very brief. The Division held with brigades in depth, the two front-line regiments being disposed abreast, the left exactly opposite Cantigny. The line of resistance and the support line here were garrisoned by two companies, one (right) facing the town, and the other (left) fronting on the northern portion of the village and the wheat fields that stretched away from its outskirts. It is with this left company sector, on the north flank of the Division, that this record particularly deals.

The entry of the Americans into the line was followed by feverish activity in extending and improving the existing defenses. Work on trenches, wire, and shelter was pushed forward vigorously. In three nights, for example, the troops in the rear area dug a communication trench 6 kilometers long (30), and the reserves customarily spent eight hours each night in work upon the position. In the sector of the right regiment special effort was directed to providing parallels which could be used, if necessary,

(30) Hist. 1st
Div, p. 72

projected attack, were put down under cover of darkness, in spite of losses due to machine-gun and artillery fire.

During these soft summer nights of romantic moonlight, but of unalluring labor with pick and shovel, the 2d Battalion 28th Infantry customarily came up to work from its position in regimental reserve, and it was while these events were moving toward the attack on Cantigny that Company E on a number of occasions experienced a considerable but mysterious annoyance. Messages passed along the line among the men were several times distorted in a peculiar manner, and a series of petty but vexatious delays occurred through the incorrect transmission of orders. Finally, on a night of special difficulties due to hostile bombardment, one platoon and part of another left their work, and filed to the rear, by reason of a false message to which the name of the company commander was appended. (33) It was not until the day before Cantigny that the solution of this mystery presented itself, at the climax of the raid against the left strongpoint on the Cantigny plateau.

(33) Lt Avery

This is not the place for a discussion of the various plans entertained by the high command for offensive action by the 1st Division in its new sector. Suffice it to say that the final decision was that the German "push" to the north would not eventuate (the "flu"--though this was not fully realized by the Allies at the time-- had taken a heavy toll from the enemy's armies, and other factors had perhaps influenced his plans); accordingly it was not considered necessary to make a major effort near

Montdidier. But one feature was clear:--the Americans must fling themselves into the fight; they must make an attack of some sort or other, for the benefit of Allied morale, and this attack must not be permitted to fail. (34) So it was decided to launch an assault to seize and hold Cantigny. The 28th Infantry was to make the assault, while the 26th held the sector on the right, the (French) 114th Infantry that on the left, the 18th constituting an immediate reserve, with the 16th, in the rear area, available for emergencies. (35) (36)

(34) Lt Col
Marshall

(35) Hist. 1st
Div, pp.
76, 78, 80
(36) G-3 Memo
416, 23
May 18

One factor, however, must receive the most vigorous emphasis at this point:--The limited area of attack made it possible for the enemy to concentrate the fire of a large number of cannon against it, from their ninety battery positions, and so the element of secrecy for the sake of surprise was a predominant consideration in planning, preparing, and launching the attack; as to which fact, more later.

The front to be attacked was held by the German 82d Reserve Division. The 271st Regiment defended Cantigny and to the south; the 272d held the northern outskirts of the village and the area to the north. These troops were reported as above average in combat efficiency, being graded 3 on a scale of 4. They were disposed in depth, each regiment having a battalion in the front line, one in reserve, and one at rest and on call in the rear area. (37) (38)

(37) Rept. CO
28th Inf
(38) Rept. CG
1st Div

For the purposes of this study it is only necessary to refer briefly to the preparations for the attack; the rehearsals in the rear area; the exercises in which the 28th practiced the attack on

the ground with tanks, flame-throwers, and other attached troops; the pains taken to prepare for every eventuality. Effort was made to leave nothing undone, but such was the mountainous labor involved that oversights unavoidably occurred. Thus, when the 2d Battalion (28th) prepared to reenter the sector twenty-four hours in advance of the remainder of the regiment, in order to make final preparations, it was found that no guides had been provided from the battalion (of the 18th) to be relieved. Time was pressing. Higher authority was preoccupied. The battalion was to entruck very shortly. So, as certain of the officers were quite familiar with various portions of the area to which they were to move (by reason of their trench-digging activities and of personal visits--although the battalion had never actually garrisoned the left front-line center of resistance), Companies E and H were designated to guide themselves into the front line, while F and G went into battalion reserve.

Then, in the early summer dusk, the battalion entered its trucks and proceeded along the dim white roads to the front; their minds intent on their own problems, they were brooding on the probable events of the next few days in the troubled eddies of Cantigny. In common with the Allied high command, they had no premonition of a greater storm then brewing to the east on the Chemin Des Dames, to break in fury within a few short hours.

This, then, was the stage-setting for the attack, without which background the story of the day before Cantigny would be without special significance.

THE COMMAND POST ON THE RIM OF DEATH VALLEY

The commander of Company E 28th Infantry had been particularly charged by his battalion commander with responsibility for a section of machine guns, under an officer, from Company C 3d Machine-Gun Battalion, which were to be attached to Company E for the attack, and were to move into the sector with that organization on the night 26/27 May 1918, to be stationed for the time being near the company command post on the rim of Death Valley. The 18th Infantry machine guns already in the position were not to be relieved till the night before the attack (39). After detrucking some five kilometers from the front, Company E moved out promptly; but it was found that the machine-gun section must necessarily pause at a town in the rear area to pick up certain materiel deposited there, and that the guns were to be carried forward by hand. Accordingly the rifle company was sent on under its second-in-command, and the captain remained with the machine guns to insure their eventual arrival.

There were long, unavoidable delays in getting the gun section under way, but at last the march forward was begun. Leaving the road as soon as possible, the little group of officers and men took to the narrow trails winding through the wheat. There was no moon at this late hour, or mist and clouds hid it from view, but the ground had been thoroughly reconnoitered and there was no danger of losing the way. From midnight onward the hostile activity became active; the sibilant passage of gas shells across the dim sky all along the immediate front indicated that the enemy was endeavoring, for reasons

(39) G-3 Memos
409, 22 :
May; and
437, 25
May

of his own, to neutralize our artillery. Now and then a crashing shock marked the use of a proportion of high-explosive shell, also. The machine-gunners, overloaded, toiled ahead, burdened with guns and ammunition; frequent halts for rest were necessary, and the slow march seemed to go on interminably. Sometime in the early morning, probably about 3:30 AM, the little column found itself moving along the rear of the plateau above Death Valley. The artillery activity had increased considerably, and the frequent explosions and whistling of projectiles had swelled to the proportions of a considerable bombardment (40). The front line, however, was quiet, and the machine-gun section was duly placed in its allotted position, while the captain hurried on to his new command post.

(40) 1st Div
Diary, 28
May 18

Here all was quiet. The relief had been without incident; the outgoing company had left a lieutenant behind for the usual twenty-four-hour period, the required routine messages had been exchanged, and everything was as was to be expected.

The 3d and 1st Platoons, from right to left, were in the forward trench on the plateau (Special Map No 2); the 4th and 2d were in the support line. An 18th Infantry machine gun was in position, as noted, on the right of the 3d Platoon. The French were in touch on the left, Company H on the right, and certain reconnaissance parties of the 1st and 3d Battalions 28th Infantry, who were to facilitate the entry of their units into the line on the next night, had ensconced themselves in the new jump-off trenches, in rear of Company E's platoons.

The area now held by the two forward platoons

(41) G-3 Memo
437, 25
May, as
amended
orally

of this company, being in advance of the indicated line of departure (the new trenches referred to), was to be evacuated by H minus 2 hours (41)--that is, by the early morning of the following day (28 May); but this adjustment could not be made till the night 27/28 May, and would be effected when moving Company E from its present defensive sector into its attack position, which was somewhat to the right.

A glance at the sketch herewith (Special Map No 2) will show a communication trench leading up to the front line in the company sector; the right and left platoons, both in the line of resistance and support line, were on either side of this trench, and on the right it will be seen that this approach and the two parallels, together with a (front-line) switch trench, formed in effect a quadrilateral or four-sided figure, of which more hereafter.

At about 4:00 AM on 27 May, then, all was as it should be in the front line at Cantigny. The opposed artillery were thundering at each other with some vehemence, but the plateau and Death Valley were quiet. One feature the commander of Company E would have preferred different; the company command post, though in the best available location, was too far from the platoons. The French Colonials had perhaps held in greater depth and width here, for the site was a heritage from their day. But in any case it was the prevailing doctrine of the period to make no radical changes on the night of a relief, and the attack on Cantigny would soon render the matter of no importance. Accordingly, having checked up on these and many other details, the company commander composed

himself to sleep until his front-line inspection at or after daylight.

In that day and that locality the bickering of the artillery was no preventive of slumber, but it was with a quick realization that the chant of the guns had considerably increased in volume that our friend awoke, at a gentle shoulder-shaking, to find himself staring into the somewhat concerned faces of the other occupants of his shallow dugout. It was five o'clock.

"Captain," said his second-in-command apologetically, "I don't want to wake you up about a mere bombardment, but this has been getting steadily louder, and I don't like it."

To which the liaison officer left by the 18th Infantry added, with a frown: "Same here. But it's hard to tell; the old place has been picking up lately, and they've doused us two or three times a night."

Together they listened to the clatter from without. High-explosive shells were detonating in numbers, for the most part in the rear area; some, however, were evidently falling on the plateau, and not a few were whizzing close over the bluff and dropping clamorously into Death Valley, below. Gas, also, was being employed, though not near at hand, and the American artillery was apparently responding with vigor.

The three officers stood still in the hush appropriate to such moments; for here was confronting them one of the most frequent and disturbing problems of decision for commanders of small units in war-- a

problem that will probably recur often, also, in future conflicts if conditions are as now visualized in current teaching; a problem that again and again plagues the leaders of the lower organizations, although it is not often the subject of commentary in publications and critiques. For dugouts exist to decrease casualties from hostile fire; and to be slain out of hand in a routine bombardment, unless engaged in an essential duty, is somewhat inglorious; but to remain underground while great events are toward on the surface, is worse.

The company commander accordingly decided to make a personal reconnaissance, and explained his intentions; then, going to the neighboring shelter occupied by his 1st sergeant, runners, and buglers, he bade the two last-named accompany him, and proceeded up the slope to the crest. The bombardment on the plateau was intermittent, though fairly severe. Daylight had come, but a gray and sullen sky indicated that the sun might be late in appearing. The platoons were doubtless standing-to just now; later, after full daylight, their officers would make any special adjustments necessary in the dispositions, and thereafter would be the time for the captain's routine inspection.

The hostile front line, about 500 yards away, was at this moment wreathed in white smoke, writhing, twisting, and spitting flame. Obviously our artillery was retaliating upon the enemy's infantry, as well as upon his batteries.

A French lieutenant, near at hand, was setting stakes as guides for the tanks in the morrow's attack;

the French captain who commanded the tank group (battalion) which was to participate in the assault, also came toiling up the hill at this juncture, and in reply to his quick question, "The Boches are going to attack in a moment?", his subordinate replied quickly, "O, no. I have just come from the front trench. It is merely a bombardment, for the most part by our own artillery."

In fact, the three observers were satisfied that this was the case. The American, accordingly, placed his buglers in a short length of trench from which they could watch the front, being also protected by a convenient log shelter. Leaving the necessary instructions as to the warning to be conveyed in case of attack, he returned downhill and arranged for his 1st sergeant to keep in frequent touch by runner with the observation post. Returning to his dugout he explained the situation to the two officers there; "And now," he added, with a touch of severity, "I intend to get a bit of sleep. Let me be called if something important develops, and only then."

The little shelter was warm and cozy..... The bombardment became a distant mutter. "Give 'em hell," someone breathed sleepily. For a time the war actually didn't matter--And then everyone was wide awake, and there was a decided uneasiness in the atmosphere. A dull but rhythmic thudding, that had woven itself into the very stuff of dreams, was coming from the front. The Allied artillery, also, was still firing. And it was a few minutes of seven o'clock,--high time to be about the pressing business of the day.

Report was received that constant communication

had been kept up with the OP; that the enemy bombardment of the plateau had been gradually increasing in intensity, but that it seemed to be the usual case of an artillery duel developing into a mutual hammering at the other side's infantry.

"This is a bad business," quoth the company commander, "Being this far away from the outfit. If we were going to hold here, the PC (A.E.F. for present-day CP) would have to be moved up. But as I will be all over the place to-day, and we attack to-morrow--"

He was interrupted by a crashing clamor, about and above them. The ground shook with the explosions, and the hillside and Death Valley together seemed veritably to stagger under a rain of shell. There was a deep silence in the command post, and then a quiet movement of adjusting equipment and testing weapons. Just in case

A flurry at the entrance subsided to reveal a disheveled soldier from the 3d Platoon, who had just dived into the opening. Gray with dirt, and somewhat ruffled as to appearance, he stood up sheepishly, while the occupants regarded his informal entry with a cold and forbidding displeasure; gulping once or twice, he rendered the rifle salute from the order, and reported: "Sir, the lieutenant directs me to say that our own artillery is firing on the 3d Platoon trench."

A message was hastily scribbled to the ~~Battalion commander,~~ a company runner summoned, and at a lull in the explosions, a slap on the back, and a shouted "Now!", sped away on his perilous duty.

Another message was prepared for the 3d Platoon. No action other than notifying higher authority was possible, in fact, for the Division was

at the time holding with the most rigid type of rigid defense, and no unit commander could shift a position without special approval. Under the circumstances the 3d Platoon simply had to grin and bear it, but the company commander decided that he could at least go up and personally assist in the effort. So he sent the platoon runner back with a cheering message, and prepared to follow in person.

In a few moments it was to be discovered that this same runner had in fact failed to deliver the most important part of his message. He was a soldier of that helpful type that makes the agreeable personal orderly or "striker", but his mental faculties, never unusually good, did not tend to improve in times of stress. His career as a runner ended with this action.

It was at this moment that a familiar voice called down into the command post. It was the battalion bombing, -raiding, -gas, -and-intelligence officer, a capable and energetic lieutenant who had formerly been a platoon leader in this company. It appeared that the battalion commander wanted a report of the situation; the surgeon, at a forward aid station about 200 yards northwest of the company command post, had reported that wounded were coming in to the aid station, and that the enemy were attacking in force.

The staff officer was assured that it was only a bombardment; but, having departed momentarily, he at once returned, shouting: "It is an attack. Here's a runner from the 1st Platoon."

The new arrival was one of those close-knit, quiet, competent, swift-moving and quick-thinking soldiers designed by Nature to make ideal runners. He

told a long story quickly, in a minimum of words; and the next moment everyone of company headquarters was on top of the ground, a runner was moving off to the battalion, and the company commander and the staff officer were breasting the steep slope toward the front.

Halfway up they met the junior bugler, who checked in midstride, saluted, and reported apologetically, "Sir, a big shell bashed our OP in!" "Get on the job next time," the bombing officer told him heatedly, "Or something else will bash your head in."

The other bugler was picking himself up from the debris of the trench. It was evident that the bombardment had "neutralized" the observation post. The whole plateau, in fact, appeared to have suffered a very considerable pommeling from the artillery, which was still--though not so energetically--pounding the environs. Leaving instructions with the buglers, the officers hastened forward. Entering the main communication trench, leading to the quadrilateral, they pressed on, and found that the trench also had been the object of fire. At moments they were scrambling over blocks of earth and debris; at others they found themselves sliding down into new and deep depressions. An officer of the 3d Battalion's advance party appeared; temporarily dazed and deafened, he was unable to answer questions (as a matter of fact he did not for several days entirely emerge to his normal world), and his sergeant assistant, near by, lay stunned by concussion.

Passing the 4th Platoon (right rear), the ~~two officers~~ noted a large, blunt-nosed projectile lying intact in the trench, while two fortunate soldiers were crawling from their wrecked shelter near at hand, and regarding the minnenwerfer shell somewhat

impassively, but with respect. Their platoon leader, near by, reported: "No special damage here, but the 3d Platoon caught it hard. The artillery preparation was awful; it lasted almost two hours. Some kind of attack just came over; I'm all ready to counterattack, but I don't think it is necessary now."

They hurried on. There was a flurry of movement in the wheat to the front. The crackle of rifle fire, which had caused the new arrivals to put on a special burst of speed, broke out anew. Then a machine gun spoke its staccato rattle. A glance to the left showed men of the 1st Platoon in position; then the two officers turned to the right into the 3d Platoon's trench.

ACTIONS AND ORDERS OF THE GERMAN 272D

INFANTRY

It was probably a week before this time that the commander of the German 272d Infantry summoned his raiding officer, a lieutenant, and informed him that an effort was to be made on the early morning of 27 May to capture one or more prisoners from the opposing forces. Whether the regimental commander knew at this time of the Chemin Des Dames offensive to be launched on that same date we of course cannot say, but no doubt he did inform his subordinate that similar raids were to be executed elsewhere along that general portion of the front, and at about the same hour. It seems quite probable that these demonstrations were incidental to the great offensive to the east, though it may be, of course, that they were the result of suspicions aroused by the activity in the American

sector.

If the commander 272d Infantry followed the usual course of the other veteran armies of the period, he gave general directions at this first interview, and caused his raiding officer to work out the details and make recommendations. These, then, would be coordinated by the regiment, and submitted to the division, being passed back and forth until all parties had been heard on every point. (In the raw American army, by the way, the indications are that higher authority too often prescribed all the details, whereby the particular conditions existing on the front failed to receive adequate attention.) At any rate, on 23 May orders--later amended in part on 26 May--issued from regimental headquarters, prescribing the details of the operation (see appendix hereinafter). They were accompanied by two sketches, on which Special Map No 3 of this study has in part been based.

In brief, the plan was as follows:--A party consisting of 1 officer, 3 senior noncommissioned officers, and 5 squads (apparently about 50 men in all) was to make the raid, supported by artillery and by machine-gun and trench-mortar fire from their own and neighboring units. The assault troops were to be the Jagdkommando, or permanent raiding party, of the regiment. Additionally armed with 8 stick grenades ("potato mashers") and 4 egg grenades per man, this party, in three groups, would take position in the front-line trench (see Special Map No 3) at 3:30 AM. This was in the sector of Company B (272d), which was probably therefore on the left front of its regiment,

- (7) 6:45--7:20 Same by 2 medium mortars upon the "hedge" (obviously part of the box barrage--see below)
- (8) 6:50--7:00 Same by 8 light mortars (272d) upon the quadrilateral and 200 meters north and south
- (9) 6:50--7:20 Same by 4 light mortars (270th) upon the "hedge" (north side of box)
Same by 4 light mortars (271st) upon the front-line trench 300 meters south of the quadrilateral (south side of box)
- (10) 7:00--7:20 Box-barrage fire by artillery, to fall generally 400 meters in rear of the quadrilateral
- (11) 7:00--7:20 Fire of 4 light trench mortars (272d) on north side of box; 4 same on south side
- (12) 6:50--7:20 Fire of 2 (heavy) machine guns against the front-line trench north of the quadrilateral, and of 2 against the front-line trench south thereof.

In terms of objectives (that is, what was to happen on our side) these fires may be presented as follows:

<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Time (AM)</u>	<u>Fire of</u>
Our artillery	4:15-5:30	Gas shell

(NOTE: This actually included high-explosive shell also, and began about midnight. Toward

while Company A was accordingly on the right (north). Here the raiding party would be protected, its departure covered and retreat secured, by three light machine guns to be detailed by the front-line companies.

Supporting fires were to be provided by the artillery, by 4 heavy machine guns from the 3d (regimental-reserve) Battalion, and by 6 medium and 8 light trench mortars under regimental control (272d Infantry) and 4 each from the 270th and 271st (a total of 16 light minenwerfers). The schedule of fires as finally approved was as follows:

- (1) 4:15--5:30 AM Artillery fire with gas shell against the hostile artillery. (This actually began earlier, as we have seen, and included high explosive.)
- (2) 5:30--6:50 Zone fire for effect by 4 light trench mortars (272d) on the hostile position
- (3) 6:00--6:30 Artillery fire of destruction on entire position
- (4) 6:30--7:00 Artillery concentration on the quadrilateral
- (5) 6:30--6:40 Fire of destruction by 4 medium mortars upon the quadrilateral, and of 2 upon the "hedge" (probably north of Company E's left flank; see below under (7) and (9))
- (6) 6:45--6:55 Same by 4 medium mortars on the quadrilateral

<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Time (AM)</u>	<u>Fire of</u>
	5:00 AM	a proportion of high explosive was also directed at the plateau.)
The entire plateau	5:30-6:50	4 light mortars
	6:00-6:30	Artillery

CRITICAL AREAS

(Special Map No 3)

The quadrilateral	5:30-6:50	4 light mortars
(3d and 4th Platoons	6:00-6:30	Artillery
Company E; especial-	6:30-7:00	Special artillery
ly the former, in		concentration
the front line)	6:30-6:40	4 medium mortars
	6:45-6:55	Same
	6:50-7:00	8 light mortars

(NOTE.- At 6:55 AM (5 minutes before H hour) the 3d Platoon was thus being shelled by the hostile artillery, and by 4 medium and 8 light mortars. As its front was not over 200 yards, this concentration was intense.)

Troops just north	5:30-6:50	4 light mortars
(1st Platoon	6:00-6:30	Artillery
Company E) and	6:50-7:00	8 light mortars
south (a platoon		
Company H) of		
quadrilateral		

(NOTE.- After 6:45 AM the exterior flanks of these units would be involved in the box fire.)

North side box	6:45-7:20	3 medium mortars
	6:50-7:20	4 light mortars
	7:00-7:20	4 (additional) light mortars

<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Time (AM)</u>	<u>Fire of</u>
South side box	6:50-7:20	4 light mortars
	7:00-7:20	4 (additional) light mortars
Rear end box	7:00-7:20	Artillery

SPECIAL NOTE.- Light- and heavy-machine-gun fire could be directed all along the line till about 7:00 in order to discourage observation to the front, and thereafter could sweep the parapets north and south of the quadrilateral.

At 7:00 AM the Jagdkommando were to leave their assault positions, pass rapidly across No Man's Land, enter the first trench (3d Platoon Company E, as it eventuated) of the quadrilateral, and, seizing one or more prisoners and picking up such materiel as they could, return swiftly at a blast of the whistle to their starting point. If necessary, the center of the three "assault sections", with which the officer was to move, would go down the communication trench to the second fire trench (4th Platoon), and effect the captures there. Once returned home, the party would find special medical attention available in their own front trench. If the Allied artillery permitted, they would then move in small groups to the rear, and rendezvous in a quarry (probably in the valley east of Cantigny), where an aid station and hot food would be in readiness.

These were the outstanding features of the ~~plan for the operation. It would be interesting to~~ know just what information the Herr Oberst of the 272d Regiment gave his raiding officer as to the character of the hostile troops. Almost unquestion-

ably he knew in general who and what they were, and much about them. Not improbably he expended unusual pains on the preparations for this affair, desiring to make a certain impression on the opposition, and he evidently expected that the preparation would so stun the defense that a quick dash would accomplish the mission before they realized the situation.

(See appendix hereinafter.) This, of course, is the usual procedure for a small raid, and in this case the absence of thick bands of protective wire considerably facilitated the work of the attack.

This was, in fact, just such an operation as will be executed often in the next war involving our country and any other major power, if present-day doctrine is correct. When the Blue and Red armies lock in conflict, pauses will inevitably occur here and there, calls for prisoners for identification and information purposes will follow, and quick smashing raids by small parties operating under cover of supporting fires against imperfectly organized positions will be the logical means of providing the information sought.

In any event, on the early morning of 27 May 1918 Lieutenant "Raiding Officer" 272d Regiment of (German) Infantry, with all in readiness, looked out upon the American position from his own front-line trench. Did he have an inkling, we wonder, of the larger issues involved in this tiny affair? Or did he consider that this little raid, however important to him personally, was merely a routine foray?

However that may be, there he stood or crouched, in the gray light of dawn, and saw the western portion

of the Cantigny plateau lit by the fitful gleams and sparks of his own preparatory bombardment.

THE DEFENSE OF THE QUADRILATERAL

The moon was veiled and the stars were hidden, when the 3d Platoon, having relieved the 18th Infantry unit in its sector, settled down for the remainder of the night. On the right, Company H was in touch; on the left, the 1st Platoon. The 4th Platoon was in rear, the 2d was known to be in position behind the 1st; the necessary messages had gone to the company command post, and acknowledgement had been received.

A machine-gun squad in a clump of trees and brush on the right had reported itself, and liaison had been effected with an officer of the 18th Infantry whose command--not to be relieved till the following night--included this weapon. The hostile trench was quiet; our own sentries were posted, and the enemy's batteries, which had gradually worked up a considerable bombardment directed at our own rear area, were obligingly leaving the front line in peace. (42)

(42) Lt Avery

Daylight came, and brought the usual stand-to along the parapet, as a precaution against hostile activity. At this time, also, our own artillery suddenly reacted with fury against the hostile front line. The men were about to commence the usual police--~~shaving, cleaning clothing, and tidying up the trench--~~ when the enemy's shell-fire began to harass the plateau top and the area all about. Minute by minute this continued; so the soldiers of the 3d Platoon lay curled up quietly in the trench, except those specially

designated to observe toward the front. The fire continued methodically, but as this was characteristic of all long bombardments (that sometimes in the rear areas of this sector had lasted for hours), no special action seemed necessary. Our own artillery fire had ceased. Time went by much as it usually does in such situations, and the lieutenant moved up and down his trench, observing his own people and watching toward the front. Here and there the parapet was caving in; now and then a man was wounded. His soldiers took cover as they might, near their posts, bound up each others' hurts (mostly minor so far), and waited with the quiet philosophy characteristic of good troops when nothing can be done but wait,-- and wait, and wait, and wait. (43)

Suddenly the trench was enveloped in a cascading roar of explosive. Viciously, uninterruptedly, malevolently, the thunder-clapping shell ripped into that shallow ditch in the loamy earth. Gusts of machine-gun fire also swept the parapet from moment to moment. Here and there someone cried out; all along the trench men were falling, and a few walking wounded were evacuated. The platoon sergeant, moving along toward the center, was suddenly wrapped in smoke and fire; when the scattered mist of high-explosive fog and the uprush of earth had cleared away, the sergeant lay dead in two pieces, his trunk severed below the shoulders. The two section leaders were active and dutiful, the men--on the whole--quiet; but the scene was difficult to take in as one entity, it had the quality of a nightmare--a

(44) Lt Avery formless chaos, lit by sudden vivid flashes. (44)

A sudden series of cries brought his attention

to the hostile trench; there was movement there--nothing as yet definite, but unquestionably something: a bobbing of helmets, a shifting along the line of the parapet. Drawing his Very pistol, he checked its cartridge charge with a glance, and sent up the signal--again and again and again--for the defensive barrage. There was a tumultuous thudding from the rear, a rushing across the sky, and the American barrage fell,--to the immediate front, to the immediate rear, and on the 3d Platoon trench. The lieutenant shouted to his runner: "Go to the captain. Tell him the Boches are attacking, and our barrage is falling on our own trench!" Then again and again he sent up the signal for lengthening the range. The trench had become a scene of horror; in places it was no longer a trench, but merely a smear on the ground. He looked again to the front, and a vast explosion suddenly enveloped him. He was knocked down, crushed, bruised, and thrust inexorably downward; tons of dirt seemed to be flooding down upon him; and the light went out from above, while a thin stream of earth particles came sifting past his head, which was jammed down upon his unbent knees. Above he heard very dimly cries of warning and encouragement, and then the thin crackle of rifles. (45)

(45) Lt Avery

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Lieutenant "3d Platoon" Company E was considerably the senior in point of service with the 1st Division, and when the bombardment became quite severe, he took stock of the situation rapidly. The 3d Platoon was being fearfully punished, but the other three were evidently having light losses. He promptly moved up personally to the 1st Platoon, and cast a wary

eye on the German front line. He saw the movement along the hostile trench; he added his own signal to those already sent up from the 3d Platoon; he shouted for a runner to go to the company command post; and he found himself caught in his own barrage, which fortunately did not fall squarely on the 1st Platoon. When the barrage ceased, as it did soon thereafter, the hostile fire also seemed to lessen. And suddenly he saw the German infantry emerging from their trenches. (46)

(46) Lt Simon

A shout of warning and almost of pleasure went up on the instant. Here were the enemy's infantry; his artillery would now lift. And lift it had, indeed. True, machine-gun fire still stung into the parapet, but the men, momentarily dodging down, continued to eye the approaching raiding party. A soldier suddenly laughed softly to himself. "By God," he soliloquized, "I'll bet they are as scared as I am." "Let 'em come," commanded a voice suddenly, "None of them will go back." (47)

(47) Plat Sgt
1st Plat

The raiding party was near at hand almost at once, moving at a slight oblique toward the 3d Platoon; and now, when 50 to 75 yards away, the first line (for they were seen to be generally in two waves) began to throw grenades at the American trench. Rifle fire now came from the 3d Platoon, and the 1st Platoon added a steady, even popping. Members of the attacking unit were seen to fall, but the waves pressed on resolutely. The first line passed the ragged band of wire, the second approached it, when a machine gun from the right flank chattered suddenly,-- and the rear line of attack went down into the wheat

as if swept by a scythe. Then there was a scurry of movement near at hand, and Lieutenant "1st Platoon", to his amazement, saw one of his own men run out from the trench, hands above his head, and dash forward to meet the attack. Five gray-clad figures at once appeared around him; he spoke to them with animation, and they manifested a quite evident pleasure,--in fact, as the 1st Platoon later declared, they jumped up and down in excited joy. One of them then raised a hand to his mouth; the raid commander was about to give the signal for withdrawal. But a surge of excitement had gone up and down the 1st Platoon's trench; the men had seen and understood; they remembered the distorted messages, the false orders; every rifle and automatic rifle available seemed directed at the group of six figures, and a moment later--gray and olive drab alike--they fell in a huddle amidst the wheat, and lay still. (48)

THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE RAID

When the company commander turned into the 3d Platoon's trench, he found it not a trench, but a twisted conglomeration of weapons, dirt, dead, and wounded, with here and there two or three untouched soldiers, grouped in shell holes or short sections of ditch, calling to each other and painstakingly firing their rifles to the front. He was unable to find the lieutenant; so, putting the senior available sergeant in command--a function already being exercised--, he hurried to the 1st Platoon. At this point the attack had just reached its objective, if the last desperate rush of a few brave men could be considered

the assault of the now-destroyed Jagdkommando; most of these survivors fell dead a few yards from the trench. A few figures were all that could now be seen to the front, moving about through the wheat at some distance; now and then one of them fell. Evidently the raid was over, and the clean-up could be begun. The captain commanded cease firing, ordered a check of personnel, and returned to the 3d Platoon, where he found Lieutenant "2d Platoon" directing the reorganization. Together they made a search for the missing platoon commander, and finally found him buried two to three feet deep, almost suffocated, and in pitiful physical condition but--having asked at once for news--in a proud mental state.

The wounded were for the most part in a sad situation. Terribly mangled as many of them were, their evacuation was attended with difficulty. A litter was improvised for the lieutenant, and the captain conducted him over the top to the rear, directing that he be carried to battalion headquarters to give a detailed report. He also sent a message there, giving important details, and then returned to the line.

Stretcher bearers were now coming up from the rear, and the wounded were being removed. The jumble of equipment and the litter of clothing, bandages, and human remains in the front-line trench of the quadrilateral were in some degree being straightened out. But the men were becoming dull and languid by reason of reaction, and had to be urged on to their tasks.

A proud soldier of the 1st Platoon exhibited

an unharmed prisoner, who had just come in from the wheat and surrendered. Another 1st Platoon man, somewhat befuddled as to exact happenings, exhibited his own rifle, the handguard ripped away (but the soldier's hand uninjured), a German rifle, and the owner of the latter weapon, with a bullet hole in his leg, who lay in the trench and awaited disposal.

It appeared that at the height of the action this sturdy enemy soldier had appeared suddenly on the parapet opposite our man. Both had lunged with the bayonet, both had instinctively parried, and both had fired one round. That of the attacker splintered the wood on the American's rifle; the latter's shot brought down the foe with a clean hole in his leg.

The wounded prisoner had a story to tell of raids or attacks to be made elsewhere, either then or later, to strike terror into the hearts of these raw American troops. He averred--for whatever it might be worth--that his division commander proposed to make life thoroughly miserable for his opponents.

Both prisoners were hustled promptly to the rear.

A check-up found no men unaccounted for, and the deserter, traitor, spy, or whatever he might be, who lay dead in front of the trench, was identified. He was a comparatively recent replacement.

The dead raid commander was searched, and his orders and maps for the operation were found and dispatched to higher authority.

The company aid man (of the medical department) was permitted, after assisting our own wounded,

to visit the enemy casualties lying to the front; and the enemy's stretcher parties were suffered to come forward to evacuate the wounded. However, only three or four of the Jagdkommando 272d Regiment are believed ever to have returned alive to their own trench.

The platoons were now able to report their losses; there had been few casualties except in the 3d Platoon, which had lost half its strength--about 18 men evacuated, out of a total present of 36.

The 18th Infantry machine-gun officer was active and helpful. Another lieutenant of the same regiment had appeared from the rear, being presumably the liaison officer left, by the relieved battalion, at battalion headquarters. The captain, having put everything in train, departed for his command post, leaving the two 18th-Infantrymen and Lieutenant "2d Platoon" in conversation near the junction of the approach trench and the front parallel. A moment later the Allied artillery opened again without request from the company sector, and a messenger from the 1st Platoon appeared at the company command post to state that our artillery fire had again fallen on our own line, that Lieutenant "2d Platoon" was badly wounded, that Sergeant "Junior Section Leader" 3d Platoon was dead, and that both 18th Infantry officers had also been killed.

It was a moment of extreme depression; more messengers to the rear, more litter bearers going forward, more work and more worry; and Private "Runner", 1st Platoon, sitting in a huddle on the ground, was sobbing quietly to himself. He did not yet quite "understand the war", as the men used to say;

but then very few in the 1st Division, at that time, did.

A middle-aged French captain came trudging across Death Valley at the head of a small column of French soldiers, and reported them for duty with Company E as flame-throwers in to-morrow's attack. Noting the mingled grief and rage on the faces about him, he asked, "What is it that it is?" and on being informed, he remarked comfortingly: "Courage, mes braves! All artillery is like that. It is the war." It was comforting; and the artillery soon ceased firing.

The 18th Infantry liaison officer (with the company) was now just returned from the front line. Full of praise and lively comment, he remarked in passing that a rumor was abroad to the effect that the left front-line platoon of Company H had deserted its trench, and no longer supported Company E's right. Investigation revealed that this platoon had lost heavily in the bombardment, and upon the death of its lieutenant, had withdrawn to the west edge of the plateau. Thence, reorganized by the capable and energetic officers of the company, it had promptly been returned to one of the new jump-off trenches, from which point, comparatively secure, it was able to cover its original front. Company H was one of the volunteer replacement units which had joined the regiment during the past winter. It lacked the training of the other companies, and, composed in large part of a medley of imperfectly assimilated foreigners, it lacked also the homogeneity of the other units. Stiffened with

complements of men from the other companies, and provided with able officers, it had nevertheless not as yet reached the same standard as the remainder of the battalion. The next few days accomplished wonders for this company.

Cheerful and confidence-inspiring messages were now arriving from the higher echelons. The reader, knowing the pains that had been expended to insure the success of the next day's attack, can appreciate the anxiety in which the various headquarters had awaited definite news of the morning's action. The loss of prisoners from the 28th Infantry at this moment would have been most unfortunate. It appeared that simultaneous raids made against the 26th Infantry on the right had been repulsed in two instances, but that prisoners had been lost. However, as the two men captured by the enemy (49) knew nothing of the attack, their loss was insignificant.

(49) Major
Whitson

The reserve companies of the 2d Battalion 28th Infantry had, it appeared, been alerted for counterattack, which it was of course unnecessary to make.

The staunch resistance of the 3d Platoon appeared to be a source of gratification to higher authority. It was of course a hopeful indication of the fighting qualities of the division.

How closely the various headquarters were following the fortunes of the 28th Infantry at this time may be indicated by the incident of the young engineer officer. Inexperienced and unfamiliar with the terrain, as he had been in the sector only twenty-four hours, he was somehow nevertheless sent forward

with a working party on the very night before the attack. He apparently lost his way and was captured. Corps and army headquarters were deeply concerned, and for a time considered suspending the operation. (50)

(50) Capt
Caffey

Any possibility of a leak of information to the enemy was sufficient, under the circumstances, to cause a shiver of apprehension up and down the ladder of responsibility.

It was not until seven years later that the commander of Company E learned of the one flaw in the conduct of the defense. Two men of the ~~2d~~ Platoon were discovered during the affair, in the woods 500 to 600 yards in rear of their unit, where they were apprehended by personnel of the 2d Machine Gun Battalion. Unable to account for their movements, they were returned under guard to their platoon. (51) The evacuation of the platoon commander for wounds, as already noted, probably caused the failure to report this circumstance. The men must have been returned in time for the check of personnel already mentioned. These two were later among that minority that were more or less consistently guilty of skulking.

(51) Maj
Ransom

On the arrival of Lieutenant ~~and~~ Colonel "2d Battalion" at his forward command post on the night 27/28 May, where he was to make final preparations--in Company E's old command post--for the attack of next day, he said to Captain "Company E": "I have found out why our artillery was shooting you up. They thought those forward trenches were to be evacuated by J minus 2."--"By H minus²", interjected the captain; "I have in fact just moved them."--"A difference of one letter and of almost two days,"

said the colonel (for J day was the World-War American equivalent of present D day). "And that," he added, "Is how it happened!"

The 3d Platoon attacked next day in the front line. It had two skeleton squads in assault, and one in support. Led by its one remaining sergeant, it followed the barrage through Cantigny, moving competently and cannily from hole to hole about 30 to 60 yards behind the inner wall of explosions. At the objective it dug itself in and endured three days of torture by bombardment and counterattack. It then came out of the line with a strength of 10 men, but it was still a platoon, and happily and proudly conscious of that fact.

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

The raid on the quadrilateral would have been without special significance in other than the special circumstances then existing. Coming as it did, however, on the day before Cantigny, and involving as it did the plans for that critical operation, it was ^{as} a matter of fact an action of some moment to the Allied cause.

✓ Before examining these larger issues, however, it is proposed to comment on the actual events of the action, as to both the combatants. This analysis should repay the effort, for as has already been stated in the narrative, precisely this type of ~~operation is to be expected in the future.~~ Pauses in combat have always occurred in war, particularly as between large bodies, and probably will recur; it is reasonable to expect that at times they will be of some duration, and accordingly a certain degree

of stabilization will inevitably follow. We are taught nowadays that in six hours, when protected by covering forces, troops can provide themselves with squad trenches or individual pits, connected by shallow trenches, and guarded by at least one band of "tactical" wire. If little clearing of the field of fire is necessary, they can add to this, also, communication trenches and even "protective" wire. Such a degree of organization would in some respects be superior to the existing defensive systems at Cantigny.

These swift and sudden onslaughts will be the most practical method of obtaining prisoners for intelligence purposes. They will be a not uncommon event in the life of the soldier and his immediate commanders. As in the past, they will probably be the chief source of dread among the men who do the fighting, for they are peculiarly deadly combats, fraught with more terror to the individual than even a general attack, whether he moves forward with it or assists to meet it.

Small raids constitute an acid test of the character of the troops involved. Any slight failure in foresight may bring down disaster on the offensive; while the defense, having to concede the initiative, is beset by all the terrors inseparable from such situations. The commanders of our platoons, companies, and battalions of infantry in the next ~~days will probably be keenly interest-~~ed in all aspects of raids.

The plan of the operation was characterized by method and simplicity; it followed the recognized procedure. A relatively short but violent preparation

of "drum fire" was to shift at the given hour to form a box barrage. The assault, moving swiftly from its initial position, was to penetrate the hostile line, and, protected by the barrage, seize prisoners from the demoralized defenders. The plan had, however, two major defects.

The German maps captured by the defense were not up-to-date representations of the American trench system. This would indicate that the information obtained from aerial photography was imperfect. It seems probable that the German command had no suspicion that the Americans held the forward trenches in such strength; they themselves habitually defended in considerable depth, even within the company. No doubt they assumed the front-line elements to be disposed in groups clear back to the western rim of the plateau. So perhaps they felt it necessary to bombard the entire surface of this forward area; at any event they thus distributed their fire, and so lavished it on points where it had no effect. Had it been concentrated on the first two trenches throughout, as it was on the 3d Platoon, the raid would have had a fair chance of success. The deduction is that their preparation was defective because their information was incomplete.

This discussion of supporting fires leads to considerations of special interest to the infantryman. So far as he is concerned, the events of battle may be neatly catalogued as proceeding from the effects of his own fire, the effects of his supporting fire, and the effects of the enemy's fire.

The effects of rifle fire are relatively well known, although even here there is room for

profitable study: for example, as to what really is effective battle rifle range. The indications are that this factor nowadays depends not so much upon the technical perfections of the weapon, nor even on long-distance proficiency of the marksman, but rather upon the range of the battle vision (often less than the length of the field of fire) of the soldier in combat. But, however this may be, certainly no such approximately correct appreciation exists as to the fire effects of artillery and of infantry cannon.

So little understood, indeed, are the essentials of this important matter in our service, that even the obvious fact is neglected that, to the "doughboy", the importance of cannon fire depends not only on its accuracy--because this is generally merely approximate--but on its intensity. If this were really understood, we should not find in our peace-time problems such meaningless statements as "the enemy is shelling so-and-so ridge", or "the hostile artillery is interdicting the so-and-so road". Such interpolations are of no assistance in forming an estimate unless they indicate the facts as they could and would be ascertained by observation under actual conditions in the field; as, whether the bombardment is light, medium, or heavy, and whether the interdiction is effective or otherwise.

If any balanced study exists in our army as to the probable influence of artillery in the next war, it has not been given general notice, even at The Infantry School, where the matter is or should be of special interest. Is it really certain that our combat wagons, machine-gun carts, mounted

personnel, and the like, can operate so close to the front as is now doctrine? Or is this merely a growth of opinion, or the result of some one's dictum, received as fact without due analysis?

In the World War, the artillery, alone, crushed well-prepared counterattacks, on occasion, even when already under way. Comparative data as to pieces available and area covered could no doubt be assembled. Lacking it, are we in fact certain of the potentialities of such fire in the usual large operation of the future?

The German newspapers and periodicals are said to be crammed with the first-hand observations, as to such matters, of competent World-War officers; but translations of this invaluable source-material are not available in our country. Is our army, indeed, actually much better informed now as to this vital matter than it was in 1917?

The raid on the quadrilateral indicates clearly that to "fix" a unit by such fire requires a very strong concentration, such as our division artillery could not now provide except at selected spots. The 1st, 2d, and 4th Platoons were severely pounded; their trenches were caved in in places, and the ground around about was generously bespattered. But they were not fixed; not only were they able to observe, but also to fire--to the flank as well as to the front--, and it is quite clear, as well, that they could readily have launched counterattacks. As for the 3d Platoon, violent as the bombardment was, it did not prevent observation and firing; it did prevent movement, however, for the platoon probably

could not have shifted position while the preparation was at its heaviest.

The hostile machine guns also joined in the preparation, but their fire, as well, was unable to prevent observation, nor could it deter the 1st Platoon from firing to the flank and so materially assisting to repulse the attack. Again, it should be noted that our own artillery had torn up the earth about the German front line for perhaps half an hour (beginning about 5:00 AM, as noted), but it had evidently not seriously damaged the raiding party, then waiting in its trench. It may, of course, have put one or more machine guns out of action; and this is a possibility--nay, a probability--that we must include in our calculations when we allot missions to these weapons.

Our own machine guns, valuable as they are, cannot be relied upon exclusively for fixing purposes. Thus, had the 18th Infantry gun in the quadrangle^{alotm} been destroyed by the bombardment (and only good fortune preserved it), the 1st and 3d Platoons would have had, to put it baldly, just twice the killing to do. Nor are final-protective-line bands of fire always so effective. After the Cantigny attack, for example, Company E, then in the new front line east of that village, executed a night raid with twenty men against the position of a hostile company. The artillery support, as it happened, proved ineffective, and a band of low wire, not previously known to exist, held up the raiding party for a palpitating moment. A machine gun, firing from a flank along the wire, sent a stream of bullets around the men's ankles, but did

no serious damage. The raiders sprang on, after a brief hesitation, bounding over and through the wire, which in fact inflicted more wounds than the gun.

The gun in this case was knocked out by a 3-inch-trench-mortar shell, equipped with a special detonating device, which murderous projectile was flung upon the weapon and its crew by a dour corporal who was equipped therewith in order to deal adequately with the dugout of the defending company commander. The discharge demolished the entire emplacement, and unfortunately administered a mortal wound, as well, to the assailant himself, and so the enemy company commander escaped special attention.

Many other true stories might be told to show the vagaries of artillery and machine-gun fire: as in the case of an officer at Cantigny who walked around, untouched, for a half-hour during the consolidation, with bullets whipping about his ankles; but when he lay down to seek cover he presented a larger target, and was hit almost at once. (52)

(52) Capt.
Butler

The efficiency of supporting weapons depends therefore, among other things, on the fortune of war; if machine guns, for instance, were actually so deadly in practice as they are in theory, the Allied successes of 1918 would not have been possible.

To depend upon artillery, infantry cannon, or machine guns--alone--to fix a portion of the hostile line, is to incur the risk of grave error. It were splendid, indeed, if the infantry could move along covered approaches exclusively, avoiding the necessity of sending secondary attacks (for fixing purposes) across those bare and menacing plains and hillsides.

But it is only^{by} the advance of assault troops that fixing can be insured; and old as war is, no means has ever yet been found for waging it without fighting.

Fixing by fire alone is possible, of course, on a limited area, where a very heavy concentration can be utilized, and this is the usual method employed to safeguard the flanks of a raid. In the case of the left platoon of Company H, whose position was faced away from Company E, less of a preparation would probably have kept them engrossed with their own troubles; the ground, moreover, prevented their firing effectively to the left flank.

As to the second major defect in the hostile plan--a failure which alone has led to the break-down of many attacks--, its cause lay in the order that the assault be launched and the preparation lifted at the same moment (7:00 AM). Had the Jagdkommando closed up on its covering fire prior to that hour, and then, as it lifted, flung a shower of grenades into the trench, and, a few moments after their explosion, rushed into it, they might have obtained their prisoner. Of course, their preparation having been imperfect, they would have suffered some losses due to rifle fire from, especially, the 1st Platoon while advancing, and almost certainly would have been considerably cut up by the 1st Platoon, the counterattacking 4th, and (if they failed to find and silence it) the machine gun, while retiring;--but they would probably have fulfilled their mission.

This aspect, also, of the attack--its co-operation with its supporting fires--calls for careful analysis, for in it lies an essential idea of far-reaching

importance to the American soldier of to-day and to-morrow. Our present doctrine--1928--calls for following the rolling barrage at not more than 100 to 150 yards. The maximum distances, thus stated, are likely to be taken--and are indeed often treated--as the usual distances; but such was not the teaching or the practice of veteran troops ten years ago. The French division of Chasseurs Alpins who conducted the training of the American 1st Division in 1917 habitually taught that the infantry should follow its barrage, and close up on its other covering fires, as closely as possible. This, also, was the doctrine of those veterans from the British and Canadian armies who came in the "early days" to join the 1st Division. To all of these the dictum that it was preferable to lose a few of our own men from our own artillery fire rather than lose most of them from the enemy's small-arm and machine-gun fire, was an elementary but fundamental point in training and practice. Their maxim was that the last shell and the first man should reach the hostile trench at the same moment, and this was insisted upon in training the smaller units in the field, and in the French schools for noncommissioned officers and for officers.

The 28th Infantry followed the barrage at Cantigny at a distance as close to its hither edge, at times, as thirty yards, utilizing the shell holes for cover almost as soon as they were made; and the strongest German counterattacks against the new line east of Cantigny broke down largely because the enemy followed his barrage at from 100 to 150 yards, thus giving our infantry a few moments to rise in the

(53) Rept.
CO 28th
Inf

trenches and meet the assault with fire. (53)

Soldiers do not require warning as to the damage our own barrage may do; this is impressed upon them by the wall of smoke and flame itself. What they do require is training to take full advantage of the assistance thus afforded them.

The objective selected for the raid was ideal in so far as a study of the ground could indicate to the German 82d Reserve Division. It was the left of the sector held by the Americans (from whom no doubt prisoners were particularly desired); and had it been farther to the right, but in the same battalion area, it would have subjected the attack to possible flanking fire from the woods south and southwest of Cantigny (see Special Map No 2). However, as matters actually turned out, the raiders would probably have obtained their end had they struck at Company H, just to the right of the quadrilateral. They could at least have obtained identifications from the dead, and would probably have suffered little loss. Had one of the older companies been holding here, on the other hand, the Jagdkommando would probably have failed as signally as was in fact the case. On such small details of mere chance do great decisions hang.

The American phase of the action also affords opportunity for deductions of some interest and of a certain importance.

~~The location of the company~~
unduly far from the platoons, as already noted, accentuated the difficulty so often confronting

company and platoon commanders, rearing its head as it does with every bombardment of more than average intensity. Any pause of even a few hours will be utilized, both by attack and defense, to construct shelter, and shelter is responsible for this problem. The enemy's shelling, if other than the merest routine, will bring the platoon leader out of his hole to insure that those men on security duty are in fact posted and alert, and that the others are properly sheltered. The company commander, in turn, must estimate the moment when his presence "on top" is essential; to emerge before that moment is to take needless risk, but to remain below when he is needed at the ground level is to be guilty of neglect of duty. Generally speaking, unless an observation post with some protection affords him a good view from elsewhere, not too far away, he will find himself tactically most at ease, though perhaps personally most uncomfortable, when with his support elements, or in advance of them and in rear of the approximate center of his front-line units.

The matter of reports to higher authority is also illustrated, of particular importance--as it is--in such affairs as this, and of special importance in this particular case, inasmuch as the high command was of course directly concerned in this instance--as it often will be.

In a less well trained organization--not, ~~like this one on the verge of a major attack~~ reports would have been in order to the effect that the commotion was--so far--a mere bombardment. Such

messenger arrived, the battalion commander--who had received the somewhat anticipatory report from the forward aid station--had a representative at the company command post. This is an excellent example of the reasons underlying the present teaching to the effect that the staff shall be utilized to go out and obtain information.

The location of the support line before Cantigny, so close to the line of resistance, involved both advantages and disadvantages which are worthy of notice. Such a disposition of course subjected the support line to the effects of light-artillery fire directed at the forward trench, but it had also certain compensations. Had it been farther to the rear--for example, at the 300-yard maximum presented in present teaching, it would have been involved in the box barrage, and counterattack would have been difficult. Such, indeed, may be our expectations in the future, particularly on the forward-slope positions now advocated; the usual attack will strike the main line of resistance, while its covering fires lift to the support line; local counterattack, if it is to be effectual, must then be almost immediate, for otherwise the attack comes on or consolidates the captured line; but immediate action cannot be taken if the covering fires are resting--a screen of bursting shell--on and in front of the supports. The practice of holding these elements in hand in covered positions away from their prepared positions has much to recommend it; the men can often more readily be moved from the shelter of woods, even if under fire, than

reports had in fact been rendered by this same company on a similar occasion, previously. On the dawn of its first day in Remiere Wood, in the Siecheprey subsector (near Toul, as noted in the narrative), the 1st Platoon had received and repulsed the flank element of a raid directed mainly against the neighboring French. The company, isolated by a box barrage neatly encompassing its area, had notified the battalion commander of the bombardment, and quietly awaited events. Surprised and gratified, later, by the issue of a congratulatory memorandum stating that this was the first occasion when a demonstration against a portion of the Division front had not resulted in alarming the entire sector, the company had no intention of permitting any similar excitements to lower this standard of imperturbability, and was determined not to transmit such stimuli unnecessarily to neighboring units or to the higher command. The platoon leaders, accordingly, waited in the area of the quadrilateral until there was something unusual to report. As soon as definite indications appeared, two runners were dispatched. Had other messages been necessary, the 4th Platoon was ready to keep up communication with the company.

(54) Lt Boden-
stab

(54) The first runner (he from the 3d Platoon) forgot the most important part of his message, which fact sufficiently indicates--though it had no especially unfortunate results--the need for choosing appropriate personnel for this duty. However, the mere calling for the barrage put higher authority on notice as to unusual activity afoot, and even before the second

from trenches. But in any case the counterattack will have to move through a wall of fire to its objective, whereas if the support is originally posted at 100 yards from the line of resistance, or slightly less, it will be freed--also--when the fires lift from its objective, and can move out promptly on its mission. The disadvantage of suffering from the same fire as is directed at the line in front, will be even less marked than in the World War if the present apparent belief in the relative weakness of the artillery proves to be fact.

The tragic error which led to our own artillery laying its defensive barrage along the 3d Platoon's trench was apparently due to the comparative inexperience of the Division. As in all new machinery, the various parts were not all as yet working in unison. Only actual operation under service conditions could reveal such defects, and bring into being that smooth, well-adjusted mechanism which was to develop in the 1st Division. Even old and war-tried units experience these difficulties. Infantry can and must learn to expect them as a part of the soul-testing burden of its uniquely-difficult and uniquely-proud existence. This was not the last such incident in this organization, but the record of the Division is proof that, with good will and real effort everywhere, such accidents need leave no permanent ill-effect. The mutual confidence of the two cooperating branches within this Division leaves no doubt on that score.

In a veteran unit much can be done to

minimize such difficulties by leaving considerable discretion to the leaders of small infantry units. Thus, after the Cantigny attack, when this company had returned to the line east of the village, and, the sector having considerably tranquilized, was holding part of the new positions there, three trial artillery "shoots" were held one night on the front of the 1st Platoon. The first salvo of the first "shoot" fell on and near the Platoon; so the sergeant commanding calmly moved the men back 100 yards to shell-holes, where they comfortably observed the fire. Returning them to position thereafter, he took them back to the shell-holes again for the second "shoot", which also fell short. When the third, for which he made similar preparations, fell still farther short-- in fact, in and around the Platoon--the sergeant simply returned them to their trench, where, in security, they watched their artillery shelling the area behind them. The control of the Platoon was perfect, and there were no losses. (55)

(55) Sgt
Weaverling

Of course an elastic defense resulting from such discretion is not always successful against raids. In the Company E night raid already mentioned, the occupants of the hostile trench fled swiftly on the arrival of the attack; but, one elderly defender stumbling over an obstacle, the agile raiders pounced upon him and gained their prisoner, whereas a stiff defense might have beaten them off. Again, on 14 June 1918 a unit of the Division, to the left of Cantigny, opposed an elastic defense to a German raid, and lost a

(56) 1st Div
Diary, 14
June 18

prisoner (56). But many instances might be cited where

such methods were successful. Probably a rigid defense is the wiser course with green troops, and an elastic system with veterans, depending upon circumstances.

Company E obviously had good lieutenants. They fought their own fight up there in the front line, with courage and with dogged endurance. Lieutenant "2d Platoon" called for the barrage only when he saw the hostile infantry leaving their trench. Lieutenant "3d Platoon" had already sent up the signal, a few moments early, but he was not, as it happened, to blame.

At the time of the attack on the quadrilateral there was a general ignorance, at least in the lower units, as to the distinction between the defensive barrage and counterpreparation. And indeed it seems that this vital matter was misunderstood elsewhere, for the Division staff appears, as late as 6 July 1918, to apply the term barrage to what was really a concentration (57). And search of the orders as to signal communication for the Cantigny attack has failed to yield anything definite as to signals for or the use of counterpreparation fires. Accordingly, Lieutenant "3d Platoon" called for the barrage, when the counterpreparation was in fact what was really needed at the moment. (He anticipated the need, however, only by a few minutes.) This sort of misunderstanding also cropped up during the consolidation after the Cantigny attack, and orders were thereafter issued to correct such errors.

The quadrilateral affair also indicates, as

(57) 1st Div
Diary, 6
July 18

many other such actions, that the assault is not a thing of the past. To be sure, only one attacker actually assaulted, but had the preparation been more effective, numbers of them would have reached the American trench, where a stiff fight with bullet, bayonet, butt, and knife would certainly have ensued until the counterattacking supports put an end to it. A nasty encounter of that very nature had attended a strong German raid on the 18th Infantry in Remiere Wood (in the Toul sector) in March, as the condition of the dead made only too evident. The assault, then, as some would have us think, is not a thing of yesterday.

Nor, accordingly, is the use of the bayonet, which thus proves itself a highly practical weapon, quite aside from its sufficient justification as a morale stabilizer. And the usefulness of the combined parry and thrust, as taught in France, was sufficiently demonstrated by the 1st Platoon soldier who exhibited the prisoner he had laid low in personal combat. Any motion to discard this parry, such as now is being proposed in certain quarters, would well be tested in the light of war experience.

By far the most interesting and valuable deductions, however, to be drawn from this action, are related to the psychological factors. Cantigny was, as we have noted, a psychological crisis, and the affair of the quadrilateral was a minor, preceding, crisis of the same character, leading up to the action of the following day. The American army was undergoing a test at that period on the Cantigny

plateau, and the circumstances were such as to throw into high relief its good and bad qualities, as an augury of the character of American soldiers of the future.

There was a certain amount of panic in the air that morning of the day before Cantigny; nor was it confined to the Americans. The reconnaissance detail of the French tank battalion sped down Death Valley at the height of the action, crying out that the line was broken. An American private, following in their wake, paused long enough to announce dramatically, with a foreign accent,--"Retreat! They have broken through." The machine-gunners to whom he addressed himself rushed to their posts; in the temporary flurry, he was forgotten. A few moments later search was instituted for him as a spy, but he could not be found. (58) He was probably merely an excited stray from Company H.

(58) Capt
Waltz

At about the same moment the regimental dump on the southwest slope above the valley blew up, and sent everyone in the neighborhood, including a platoon of Company H, scurrying to escape the grenade fragments and pyrotechnic flames. They ran, however, only far enough to avoid this danger, and promptly re-formed, on order. (59) The quick recovery from these excitements was a marked characteristic of the day, and the reorganization and immediate return to control of Company H's front-line platoon, already described, was another case in point.

(59) Maj
Huebner

Twenty-four hours later these same men of Company H were leaping to the parapet beyond Cantigny,

to repel counterattack with bullet and bayonet. The four days 27--30 May indicated the value of training in two ways: they showed plainly the initial differences as between this young company and the older units of the battalion; and they provided the necessary experience to bridge the gap. Aside from a tendency to specialize in the collection of grisly souvenirs, there was little in Company H, after Cantigny, to find different from the older--and somewhat more American--companies.

Significant of the future, then, were the touches of panic and the prompt return to order. Equally indicative, even at this early stage, was the foreshadowing of the problem of straggling. The two skulkers of the ~~Red~~ Platoon have been referred to. There was, however, very little malingering at Cantigny; but its proportions grew thereafter. At Soissons Companies E and F came out each with a strength of 30 men, but grew in a few hours to 60.

(60) Lt Barnett (60) In the Argonne the number of skulkers in the
(61) Maj Lee regiment was comparatively much larger (61). This is no new problem, but the American tendency to avoid discussion of it is regrettable, and may have serious consequences. The stark facts should be put on paper and given wide discussion, for the presence at one time in the First Army of 100,000 stragglers as estimated by the army commander (62) indicates the importance of the problem. If the personal and semiconfidential testimony of many officers of the fighting battalions is to be believed, skulking was rather more, than less, prevalent, as

S.M.
(62) Johnson,
T.M. p. 318

compared to the estimates of the high command.

Now the psychology of skulking is no secret, and it is therefore the less excusable that it is so little appreciated in its exact elements by Americans; foreigners, who had four years of war, are not so ill informed, for the high command and the civilian public had time to learn the facts,--or were less inclined, perhaps, to permit a nauseous sentimentalism to becloud their judgment.

This war, more perhaps than any other, separated the combat soldier from the higher commanders; in our army, even the regimental commander was often nothing but a name,--if that. And so a gulf formed between them, and out of it rose a bitterness that even to this day has not wholly departed. The high command thought it appreciated--but did not wholly--the suffering and difficulties of the fighting units. Staff officers were bedecked with distinguished decorations for taking risks that were routine--and not specially rewarded--in the front line. When the men in the combat echelon, stricken with fearful losses, faltered, the higher command threatened the leaders, ordered them on, heckled them, or relieved them of command, exhorting them constantly as to "leadership". On the one hand the front-line soldier was not adequately rewarded; on the other hand his misbehaving comrades were not duly and adequately punished. The commanders of small units felt themselves ground between the upper and the heavier mill-stones; the men (below) fighting, dying, and sometimes skulking,--a load of responsibility; the command (above) urging,

exhorting, threatening, and only too obviously--it seemed to them--not really understanding. The front line murmured grimly that the staffs were coddled; the generals too much given to directing, too little to dying. And so there was engendered a bitterness against the higher commanders that extended to include as its object the entire regular army, and has been long in fading. Of course this has happened before in a degree; but are there no means of minimizing its ill-effects?

Not the least of the irritants that added to this difficulty was the failure to deal adequately with skulking. For skulking is not wholly or even primarily the child of panic; in its most malignant form it attacks the seasoned combatant, who reasons thus: "If I go into this fight and stay there, I will probably get killed; or, worse yet, mangled. If I 'hide out', the worst to expect is a prison sentence; and that will take me out of the war." There is only one means of meeting the cold logic of this situation, and that is to replace the possibility of prison by the certainty of death by execution, as weighing against the mere probability of death on the field or of wounds. All other measures are half-measures, and--shameful reflection on the authorities and the people--they merely add to the load borne by those who are doggedly carrying on with the most arduous possible duty.

The astonishing thing is that men can still be found who, with no illusions, struggle on. These are they who will carry our arms to success, and it

is to them that the highest military authority owes its strongest loyalty; it is upon them that the government depends, and if the government does not understand its duty to them in all its implications, it must be made to understand, whatever the responsibilities incurred and the risks run by particular persons. There is a heavier responsibility that cannot be escaped.

Only too obviously the great body of our regular officers to-day are ignorant of these fundamentals of fighting; but these are the facts that should be taught in the open, not whispered about in secret. The fighting man's estimate of realities differs widely from the civilian's; and in the late war the higher American military echelons found their place somewhere between these two: not so ignorant as the civilian, but not truly comprehending. Nor does the bulk of the army to-day.

The civilian's ideas of heroism seem often silly to the war-tried soldier; too many of the amateur's exaltations are to him routine, too many--on the other hand--are unjustifiable risks. Surely these findings of human reality, reached on the battle-field, are the true stuff of military psychology; can they not be taught in peace time? They can, of course, for they have been from the earliest time. The veteran, between battles, teaches the replacement; between wars he teaches the recruit; by song and story and the grim jest of the battle-field he, perhaps unaware, instructs his audience. What is needed is a codification of this knowledge, that it may be presented as formal doctrine.

There have always been men who possessed

the art of preparing the human soul for war; the humble author of this minor chronicle has sat at the feet of one of these, who taught his followers, before they ever encountered wounds and death, not to stand aghast before them. Such teachers of the psychology of war are artists of their craft; they sink their lesson home, often themselves ^{unable} to express or explain the method they employ by instinct to that end. It is for us to study their art, as we have studied the strategic art of Napoleon, and endeavor to reduce it to clasified knowledge--to science--that we may teach it by conscious method to others. All advances in the realm of thought and action are the products of such effort.

After the attack and the three day's holding at Cantigny, a company commander, on a summer night, was burying the remains of a not inconsiderable portion of his command. Other duties were occupying his more seasoned men, and so he was employing his very new replacements for this work. And there was not a little difficulty. For they feared to touch the dead. Coming through a hedge with their burden, four of these new arrivals found that the object borne on their shelter half was sliding to earth. Shrinking from the contact of death, they let it go. But not so the "old" man, who, standing in the trench below, saw the slipping body. Stilted as these words may seem, they express the truth most simply: he received the corpsecare-fully in his arms, and bore it tenderly to the earth prepared for it.

The two buglers who, in the OP above Death

Valley, cowered under the rain of shell, failing to report the launching of the attack on the quadrilateral, passed again and again thereafter through artillery fire as intense or more so, in the mental serenity and with the physical skill born of training and experience.

These things can be taught.

Private "Runner", 1st Platoon, who wept on the slope of Death Valley on the morning of the twenty-seventh, thereafter watched his comrades being slain and mangled by the hostile artillery, and regarded it quite as a matter of course.

Lieutenant "3d Platoon", who held the front-line trench, displayed courage and staunchness. And this was the same man, as it happens, who on a previous occasion failed to accomplish a mission--nor was he the only one--because, he said, "The fire was too hot. The men would have got hurt." Half of his platoon went down in the defense of the quadrilateral; but the defense was maintained.

These things can be taught.

Psychologists of to-day are learning much about fear. A late pronouncement indicates that almost all fears are acquired by the individual; that few are inborn, and these are useful military fears (63). Now if these others are individually acquired, they are more or less subject, certainly, to expert treatment and to adaptation for definite ends. And, so psychologists tell us, they are being successfully treated, molded, and adapted.

If this is so, it is of vast military import.

(63) Wiggam
p. 130

It is ridiculous for the military men to shut his eyes to psychology, to hesitate to name it even--because it has a "high brow" sound and implications--, to evade it, to laugh at it--a bit uneasily--, perhaps to scoff a little at it. Whether he wishes to be or not, he must be a psychologist. If it is true that to make the army officer swallow his psychology, it must first be predigested, this merely indicates that we have the wrong sort of army officer. In a world that is rapidly growing up, such children cannot stand in men's shoes.

If we learn how, fear can be made an aid to courage, rewards and risks can be equitably apportioned, and perhaps our soldiers--returned to civil life--remain our friends.

These things need to be studied, and they can be taught.

LESSONS

Viewed in the light of the Principles of War as now formulated in our service, and expressed in their terms, the lessons of the day before Cantigny include the following:

The ineffectiveness of the German preparation, relatively speaking, was due to a failure to observe the Principle of Mass (superiority). A possible stunning superiority of fire was lost by reason of its distribution over what have often been called at the Infantry School "unremunerative targets". This was one of the two main reasons for

the failure of the operation.

This, again, constituted a violation of the Principle of Economy of Force. Power of fire, thus lavished on unimportant objectives, was not applied to the really critical points.

The fire, thus dispersed as to effect, failed to "fix" the defense; counterattack, if necessary, could and would have been utilized. The possibility of failure of the fixing power of fire is one never to be neglected by commanders. Accordingly, circumstances must especially justify any failure to fix, by assault, any portion of the hostile line attacked; fire alone may be insufficient.

The plans for the raid were characterized by simplicity, and were carried out in a clear-cut and resolute manner. It was not because of failure to observe the Principle of Simplicity that success was denied the attack.

Both the assailant and the defender suffered for violations of the Principle of Cooperation. The assault failed to close up behind its covering artillery and mortar fires before launching its attack. Such a serious error may be expected to exact a heavy price. In this case it constituted the second main reason for the failure of the operation.

The American artillery cooperation, by reason of the incomplete experience of the Division, was defective. The wisdom of permitting small-unit commanders discretion in shifting positions in such cases seems indicated, especially for veteran units.

One platoon leader called for the defensive barrage at a moment when counterpreparation was what was needed. This is attributable to a general misunderstanding, later corrected. The incident shows the importance of emphasizing such distinctions in terminology. On the other hand, the infantry carefully abstained from calling on the artillery until it was positively known that assistance was needed.

The defending infantry fought with an admirable unity of purpose. Individuals and platoons cooperated to good effect, and the various commanders involved took prompt action to meet the situation and to circulate information. The timely assistance rendered by the machine-gun elements was of a decisive character. Supports and reserves were quickly placed in readiness for counterattack.

The immediate preparations, indeed, for counterattack indicated as well the readiness of all concerned to take positive action, and demonstrate that the Principle of the Offensive has its applications even in the defense.

That a location of the support line from 75 to 100 yards from the line of resistance will facilitate counterattack, is another lesson to be derived under this heading.

The direct and courageous onslaught of the raiders was the sole actual exemplification of the Principle of Movement. The failure to synchronize this movement with its covering fires has been made the subject of comment above. Little maneuver was possible in this situation, but had counterattack been necessary, equally resolute advance and assault

would have characterized the movement of the defense.

That the assault will often involve a bloody combat with pistol, bayonet, knife, and gun butt, when both sides are unyielding and meet face to face, is also a lesson to be deduced at this point. A better preparation and an earlier assault would most certainly have resulted in such an encounter. The usefulness of the bayonet is thus indicated. As to the utility of the bayonet combination-parry-and-thrust, of which one hears misgivings expressed, it is certain that the 1st Platoon soldier who employed it so skillfully in emergency had no doubts thereafter.

Surprise in such an affair as this hinges on concealment of the exact moment of launching the attack. This effort was made, but was not successful because of the imperfections of the preparation fires and the vigilance of the defense.

The company commander's problem when debating on the ~~moment~~ to intervene personally in the action illustrates the handicap, as to the Principle of Surprise, which raids impose upon the defender. The Americans were not taken at a loss, however, They met the attack in the moment of its debouchment, and each element promptly informed the next higher commander of the facts.

The promptness with which reports were dispatched was commendable. Equally so, the care not to forward anticipatory, alarming reports from the combat platoons. The aid station is, in the nature of things, not to be regarded as a source of accurate information as to the front line, except perhaps as to casualties. The wounded are prone to exaggerate.

The battalion commander's dispatch of a staff officer to obtain accurate information affords an example of our present doctrine's applicability with respect to such use of the staff.

That the company command post will usually be most advantageously situated between the front-line and support echelons, or just in rear of the latter, is another lesson related to surprise.

The offense, by its failure in cooperation, violated the Principle of Security, and its ensuing debacle is largely tracable to this fact. The defense, to which security was all-important, took the necessary measures promptly and maintained itself successfully as a result. It is no easy matter to retain observation when every variety of projectile is being showered upon the sentries' posts of duty. The company buglers, indeed, failed in this respect-- a defect, however, as to which they never again gave cause for complaint. The front-line observers, however, notwithstanding the hostile fire, gave ample warning that the critical moment was at hand.

And so the staunch qualities of the 1st and 3d Platoons maintained the security of the plans of the high command,--plans that had their birth in the very seat of government; the first distinctive American attack, of the following day, was a success, and largely so because the defense of the day before Cantigny retained for the Allied plan the benefit of surprise. Indeed, on the morning of the attack on the village, the Germans mistook the artillery preparation for retaliation for their raid of the day before, and so, as one of their company commanders

informed the writer, the surprise was the more complete.

The prompt action of the men in shooting down the deserter or spy who attempted to escape was creditable to their intelligence and power of quick decision. They realized, as well as their leaders did, the primary necessity for secrecy, and they cooperated to that end.

The dispersion of the raiders' preparation fire was a violation of the Principle of the Objective, and this, together with their failure to take complete advantage of this fire in launching the assault, brought their effort to a disastrous end.

From the American point of view there was but one objective: to maintain the defense, to repulse all attacks, and to provide security for the morrow's attack. For the higher command the objective of the moment was to prove the training of this, the oldest of America's new Divisions, and to give the Allied armies and peoples a distinctive American success. This the 1st and 3d Platoons made possible, and the thrill of confidence and hope that ran through France and England after the Cantigny attack (64) affords the test of value to apply to their achievement. Coming as it did on the heels of another great Allied disaster--the German Chemins Des Dames offensive--the American success of 28 May 1918 was providential as to timeliness.

(64) Page, II,
p. 375

To the Allies, whose objective was to win the war, American troop-training had now become all-important. Technical excellence was not their main preoccupation at the moment, but rather a demonstration of the moral fiber of these New World units. This

moral quality the 28th Infantry exhibited--a quality which was no haphazard development, but the result of a long and careful training based on the sound traditions and experiences of the pre-war American regular army. Such qualities of moral endurance were not the universal possession of American troops, excellent though most of them were. And, where present, these qualities were the obvious products of a long training period which may not be permitted us in the next war. Our problem, then, is to devise means of insuring and accelerating this development; our objective is the unfolding in the soldier, at the earliest possible moment, of those veteran qualities of calm, resolution, quick decision, staunch endurance, and their like, which demonstrated their presence at Cantigny, and, brought to fruition by a constantly improved program of training through the utilization of the findings of battle-field and laboratory psychology, should be the heritage of all American troops.

The actual outcome of the World War, and the future of Europe and America, seemed, at the moment of our story, to depend upon the fighting quality of the 3d Platoon. Had a prisoner or deserter carried to the German authorities a warning of the impending attack on Cantigny, they would no doubt have made adequate preparations. That night, pulling their batteries out of the positions on which our artillery had registered, to new points of vantage, the enemy would have lain in wait for the assault. Assuming that it had nevertheless been successful, the losses of the attack would have been very great. Had the 28th failed to carry the position, the village must nevertheless have been taken. If every man of the 1st Division had had to die on the plateau of

Cantigny, the sacrifice would have been justifiable. The probable consequences of failure were so momentous that success must have been attained at any cost. (65)

(65) Lt Col
Marshall

Such a situation has no doubt occurred before in American history, and doubtless will again. All of our deductions from this action may be resolved into terms of leadership, discipline, morale, and training; and all of these, in turn, into training. As to technical training and how to conduct it we have attained no little knowledge and skill; as to moral training, very little. By every device of our invention we are striving to reduce the time necessary to convert a raw recruit into a technically-competent soldier. Are we doing as much in the moral sphere? This is the supreme lesson of the day before Cantigny, for no man can foretell where the blow may fall or the test may come. A German platoon, before the offensive of 15 July 1918,

(66) Wise, p.120 lost a prisoner--somehow, somewhere--to the French (66). And so a great offensive failed, and the history of civilization was changed. Of one thing, then, we can be sure in our army, as to these moral qualities:--We must have good platoons. They cannot be too good.

QUESTIONS

(As to the Raid on the "Quadrilateral", on the day
before Cantigny)

1. Q. What was the condition of Allied military and civilian morale when the American 1st Division was ordered to the Amiens front?
A. Very poor.
2. Q. What was the all-compelling reason for undertaking the American attack on Cantigny?
A. To gain a clean-cut American success, in order to revive the failing Allied morale.
3. Q. Which of the Principles of War as now presented in our doctrine was the predominant element in preparing for and executing the assault in the attack on Cantigny?
A. The Principle of Surprise.
4. Q. What two defects in the German raid of 27 May 1918 were mainly responsible for its failure?
A. (1) Failure to concentrate preparation fires on proper targets
(2) Failure of raiding party to close up to its covering fires just before delivering the assault.
5. Q. What was the outstanding American failure of cooperation during the defense of the quadrilateral? And to what was it due?
A. The failure of the artillery to cooperate effectively with the infantry; it was due to lack of experience.
6. Q. Did the raid on the quadrilateral indicate that the assault is a thing of the past?
A. No.

7. Q. Did the raid on the quadrilateral indicate that the bayonet is a useful weapon?
- A. Yes.
8. Q. Did the raid indicate that the bayonet parry should be retained in training, or otherwise?
- A. It indicated that it should be retained.
9. Q. What was the outstanding result of the successful defense of the quadrilateral, with reference to the next day's attack?
- A. The defense retained the security of the plans of the high command, and the advantage of surprise for the attack.
10. Q. The raid indicates the supreme importance of a phase of training now receiving little attention in our army. What is that phase of training?
- A. Moral training to face the realities of the battle-field.

APPENDIX

(From the records of the War Department; copy furnished by the
Chief of Infantry)

Summary of Information No 168,
June 7, 1918

GERMAN ATTACK WEST OF CANTIGNY
MAY 27

(From French First Army Bulletin,
June 2, 1918)

On May 27 a raid was attempted near Cantigny, in the American sector, by the Jagdkommando of the 272d Reserve Regiment, 82d Reserve Division.

The raid was a complete failure, and most of the attacking party killed.

Lieutenant UTTA, commander of the detachment, was left dead on the ground. On him were found the following orders, which show the care with which the raid was planned:

REGIMENTAL ORDER

272d Res. Inf Regt

May 23, 1918

Subject: "Tarnopol" Operations

I. On the morning of May 27, the Jagdkommando, supported by infantry, artillery, and trench-mortar detachments, will carry out a mission.

Detailed instructions in writing have been transmitted to the participating units.

Participants:

(a) Jagdkommando: 1 officer, 3 vice-sergeants-major (vize-Feldwebel), 5 squads.

(b) In addition, the 3d Battalion will furnish: 4 heavy machine guns; 2 section leaders. Their instructions will be given orally. They will report to Lieutenant Nanke (regimental headquarters) at 4:00 PM May 24.

(c) The 1st Battalion will furnish 4 light trench mortars. For instructions on placing them in position the trench-mortar officer 1st Battalion will report at battalion headquarters at 4:00 PM May 24.

(d) At nightfall on May 26 the 1st Battalion will withdraw one squad from Company A and two squads from Company B. Special instructions will be issued for the employment of these squads.

(e) During the progress of the operation, 2 light machine guns from Company B and 1 light machine gun from Company A will be set up in the departure position of the assault troops, ready to open fire quickly.

II. Accompanying this order are:

(1) a time schedule

(2) a sketch of the operation. (NOTE.- This sketch is not available, but Special Map No 3 of this monograph has been largely based on a lantern slide prepared therefrom. Editor.) The battalions will issue whatever instructions they may deem necessary. On the morning of May 26, they will report that the section leaders have been instructed as to their mission, and that the preparations have been carried out.

The following requisitions have been made:

For the heavy machine guns: 16,000 cartridges

(Rillenmunition).

For the trench mortars: 400 projectiles.

For the Jagdkommando: 500 stick grenades (8 per man), 200 egg grenades (4 per man). (NOTE.- This indicates a party of at least 50 men. Editor.)

Double rations for May 27.

III. At the end of the operation the Jagdkommando will, if possible, try to leave its own trenches and take shelter, with its booty, in the sap at the quarry. (NOTE.- Probably in the ravine east of Cantigny. Editor.) A squad of the detachment of pioneers is stationed there.

The Jagdkommando will carry its rations for May 27, if necessary the reserve rations, into the first line. In the quarry the second rations (food, coffee) will be held ready.

IV. First Lieutenant Baessler will make the necessary arrangements in the first line for first aid to the wounded. The 1st Battalion will provide the necessary personnel (doctor, stretcher bearers, stretchers, auxiliary stretchers) and will make the necessary arrangements for the dressing of the wounded and for their evacuation to the dressing station not later than night-fall. (NOTE.- The German front line, as was later learned, consisted of disconnected trenches, and there were no adequate approach trenches; hence these instructions. Ed.) Measures will also be taken to hold ready in the front line the drink ration assigned to the Jagdkommando, and to guard the reserve rations.

V. The dressing station at Maresmontiers (NOTE.- Location unimportant. Ed.) will arrange to receive and care for the wounded. The surgeon-major of the regiment will issue orders that three doctors be detailed, and that necessary arrangements be made for the evacuation of the wounded. The 3d Battalion will detail a hospital sergeant to the Sanitaets Waeldchen dressing station. (NOTE.- Location unimportant. Ed.) This

noncommissioned officer will prepare a list of the wounded who pass through that station. (The 271st Regiment has been advised accordingly.)

VI. The Jagdkommando, in assault order, will enter the departure position (trench of Company B) at 2:30 AM May 27.

VII. The system of communications is considered in a special order to the 1st and 3d Battalions. The commanders of the liaison detachments of the 1st and 3d Battalions will report at regimental headquarters at 4:00 PM May 24.

(Signed) GROTHE

272d Res. Regt (K.T.K.)

SPECIAL ORDER FOR THE JAGDKOMMANDO

Assault section A: Vize-Feldwebel Weichenbahn; 1 squad

Assault section B: Lieutenant Utta, Vize-Feldwebel Donath; 2 squads

Assault section C: Vize-Feldwebel
Kuehn; 2 squads

ORDERS

After the neutralization by gas on the hostile artillery, and fire of destruction lasting two hours upon the hostile trenches, debouch from the trench of Company B at 7:00 AM. First enter the enemy's first trench immediately north of the orchard.

(NOTE.- Obviously the 3d Platoon's sector, just north of the clump of brush in which the 18th Infantry machine gun was located. Ed.) Make prisoners, and bring back materiel. As soon as prisoners have been captured, Lieutenant Utta will be ~~informed of the fact.~~ He will then give the signal to withdraw (blast of whistle), which will be picked up by the other

section leaders. Then the three assault sections will rapidly withdraw to their own trench. A report of the prisoners, booty, and our losses will be transmitted by telephone to the command post (K.T.K.), and, if possible, in writing by means of runners.

One light machine gun and its crew will form the protection for each assault section in the front trench.

Particularly important order: Make preparations for starting without noise, concealing them from the enemy. Leave the trench exactly at the appointed time (0 hours). Enter the enemy's trench suddenly.

Assault section B will, if necessary, advance along the approach trench north of the orchard to the second trench, in order to obtain prisoners.

Swift capture and rapid withdrawal will insure success.

After returning, an effort will be made, under the protection of our artillery, to leave the trench and, in small groups, to reach the assembly point (quarry) with the captures and wounded.

A blast of the whistle means: withdraw.

TIME SCHEDULE

(NOTE.- Later amendments shown hereinafter. Ed.)

3:00 -- 5:00 AM	Bombardment of hostile artillery with gas shell
5:00 -- 7:00 AM	Fire of destruction by artillery; entire front
6:30 -- 7:00 AM	Concentrated fire of destruction by the artillery on Kaspar, the hedge

(NOTE.- ~~Probably north of the 1st and 2d Platoon trenches. Ed.~~), the

7:00 -- 7:20 AM

"quadrilateral", the orchard (in the zone of barrage fire), the machine guns in the Tiergarten (NOTE.- Location unknown. Ed.). Some smoke shells will be used. As from 6:30 to 7:00, except that the fire upon the zone of barrage of the orchard will be shifted to behind the "quadrilateral" (about 400 meters) in order to form a box fire.

6:50 -- 7:00 AM

Fire of destruction by the trench mortars: 4 medium upon the orchard
2 medium upon the first trench north of the hedge
4 light (272d Regt) upon the first hostile trench, north of the orchard
Light mortars (270th and 271st Regts) on the first hostile trench in front of them.

6:50 -- 7:20 AM

Machine-gun fire upon the first hostile trench, north and south of the "quadrilateral". Limits: to the north, point W (hedge); to the south, road Cantigny--Le Plessier (NOTE.- Road leading past CP Company E 28th Infantry. Ed.)

7:00 -- 7:20 AM

Light trench mortars (270th and 271st Regts) upon the former objective. Harassing fire.

7:00 AM

Assault sections assemble

7:00 -- 7:10 AM

Medium trench mortars north of the hedge, near point W.

(Signed)

GROTHE

TIME SCHEDULE FOR "TARNOPOL"

(Corrected)

272d Res. Inf Regt

May 26, 1918

In accordance with Order Ia 715 of the 82d Reserve Division, the time schedule has been modified as follows:

AM

4:15 -- 5:30	Artillery neutralization fire with gas shell
6:00 -- 6:30	Fire of destruction on the hostile position
6:30 -- 7:00	Concentration fire upon the objective of attack (without change)
7:00 -- 7:20	Box fire by artillery

TRENCH MORTARS

6:30 -- 6:40	4 medium upon orchard; 2 medium upon hedge
6:45 -- 6:55	4 medium upon the orchard (NOTE.- And hence upon the quadrilateral. Ed.)
6:45 -- 7:20	2 medium upon the hedge
5:30 -- 6:50	Ranging fire by light mortars (272d Regt)
6:50 -- 7:00	4 light (272d) upon the trench, then the orchard, and 200 meters to the north
	4 light (272d) upon trench W, and 200 meters south of point W (NOTE.- Location of this point unknown. It was near the left of either the 1st or 3d Platoon. However, this fire

in any case covered the quadrilateral and, generally, 200 meters south. Ed.)

AM

6:50 -- 7:20

4 light (270th) upon the hedge
4 light (271st) upon the first trench, and 300 meters south of the orchard (north limit). (NOTE.- Probably changed later to just south of Orchard, as shown on Special Map No 3, for this is where it is believed to have fallen. Ed.)

7:00-- 7:20

4 light (72d) north of point W (hedge)
4 light (272d) 300 meters south of the orchard. Box fire. (NOTE.- See note just above. Ed.)

3:30 AM

The infantry and machine guns must be in position by 3:30 AM. Otherwise no change.

The assault troops must, in any case, be back in their trench by 7:20 AM at the latest.

(NOTE.- The foregoing schedule was rearranged in the text of this monograph to show the order chronologically, as a whole and upon specific objectives. Otherwise, except for necessary interpretations, it is the same.)


SYNCHRONIZATION


In the regiment at 8:00 AM, May 26. There will be present: the liaison agent and the trench-mortar officer of the 1st and 3d Battalions, and the liaison agent of Lieutenant Utta,

At 3:15 AM May 27 the time will be communicated by runner from the regiment to the command post K.T.K., which

will transmit it. (End of order.)

SPECIAL MAP NO 1 GENERAL MAP WESTERN FRONT MAY 1918





SPECIAL MAP NO 2
SITUATION MAP
CANTIGNY, 27 MAY 1918

100 0 1 2 3 4 500
YARDS
VI 5 FT


N
SPECIAL MAP NO 3
OPERATION MAP

(BASED IN PART ON GERMAN SOURCES)

THE RAID ON THE QUADRILATERAL
CANTIGNY, 27 MAY 1918

100 200 300 YARDS

NOTE - FIRE ON ENTIRE AREA, 5:30-6:50, NOT SHOWN. SEE TEXT.

LEGEND: Artillery fire 
Mortar fire 